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Abstract 
  Threats of Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Radiological, or High Yield Explosive 
(CBRNE) events in the United States have caused the implementation of improved 
preparedness initiatives.   This paper focuses on biological readiness initiatives, and 
compares two methodologies; one already fielded called BioWatch and another 
developing project, called “A Hot Idea.”   
 
  BioWatch, a biosurveillance methodology operating since June 2003, collects air 
samples in 31 cities across the United States on filter paper that is analyzed for the 
presence of harmful biological agents.  The time from biological release until emergency 
response actions are initiated is expected to be 27-36 hours.   
 
  “A Hot Idea” uses the body’s immune response to identify the presence of 
harmful biological agents.  An increase in temperature is the body’s response to 
inoculation with a foreign agent.  Detecting a temperature increase, using infrared 
thermographers, in a statistically significant portion of population would allow earlier 
identification of a biological release and thereby accelerate initiation of response actions.  
A selected population including policemen, firemen, and postal carriers, will be 
monitored for elevations in temperature above previously developed individual 
temperature profiles.    These “monitors” have traceable routes to identify clustering of 
temperature elevations and allow delineation of the geographic area of exposure.   
   
  The two methodologies were compared using a Benefit-Cost analysis.  Benefit 
was defined as the “costs averted” minus the cost to provide surveillance, and was based 
 iv
upon the reduction in mortality expected with each methodology.  Advantages and 
disadvantages of each system, and areas needing better delineation were discussed.  
Significant challenges were identified with each methodology.     
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BIOSURVEILLANCE METHODOLOGIES 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
From historic times through present day, biological agents have had dramatic 
impacts on the human race.  The Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. involved an epidemic 
which killed thousands of Athenians and was attributed to poisoning of the water wells 
by the forces of Sparta (Warner, 1972).  In 190 B.C., Hannibal, the leader of the 
Carthagian Army, used biology to his advantage by placing poisonous snakes inside clay 
pots that were launched onto enemy vessels where the pots broke and released their 
unwanted contents (Christopher, 1997).  In 1346, Mongolian forces catapulted plague 
infested cadavers over the fortress walls of Kaffa, the city they were attacking.  The 
virulent bacteria was successful in finding new hosts inside Kaffa and, as a port town, 
plague-infested rats soon spread the bacteria to other ports throughout Europe.  Pandemic 
outbreaks of plague followed and the term “Black Death” is commonly used to describe 
the events.  Taking the lives of over 1/3 of the population of Europe, the Black Death is 
estimated to have killed 25 million people (Jackson, 2003).   The Black Death had 
significant impact on the development of medieval Europe and resulted in the period of 
time referred to as the “Dark Ages.”   
More recently, the Spanish Influenza pandemic of 1918 took more than 20 million 
lives (Gensheimer, 2003).  The virulence of the agent was great:  it took a similar number 
of lives as WWI but in 1/5th the time (van Hartesveldt, 1992).  Both today and in the 
future, biological agents affect our everyday lives.  Natural and malicious use of 
microorganisms is inevitable.  Obvious agents in our generation include Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), West Nile Virus, seasonal influenza, avian influenza, 
and the coronavirus that causes Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).   New 
agents are emerging each year.  Our country’s preparedness needs to be evaluated and 
improved to minimize the effects of the next major biological event when it occurs.   
 
The United States government currently performs biosurveillance every day with 
a biodefense initiative called BioWatch.  An early-warning surveillance system, 
BioWatch is designed to detect a release of a harmful biological agent in major cities 
across the United States.  The implementation of the BioWatch system is a step forward; 
it improves readiness posture against harmful biological agents. However, there are 
shortfalls to the program.  Rarely is a panacea identified providing comprehensive 
solutions to all aspects of a complex problem and BioWatch is no different.   
 
This thesis will explore an alternative solution to BioWatch, focusing on one in 
particular, that harnesses the human body’s immune system as its warning signal. This 
alternative involves regularly scheduled thermal infrared scanning of a portion of society.  
Core temperatures would be tracked and a pre-determined variation will signal as a 
possible exposure to a harmful biological agent.  This alternative technology is referred to 
as “A Hot Idea” and is credited to Dr. Robert Armstrong of the Center for Technology 
and National Security Policy at the National Defense University and Dr. Stephen Prior of 
the National Security Health Policy Center at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.   
The complete name of Drs. Armstrong’s and Prior’s methodology is “Rapid Detection of 
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Exposure to Potentially Harmful Materials” but hereafter will simply be referred to as “A 
Hot Idea.”  This thesis presents a comprehensive comparison between the two biological 
agent surveillance alternatives.  A benefit-cost model was developed to compare the two 
technologies from an economic standpoint.  Additionally, thorough discussion of 
intangible factors not represented in the model and other alternative biological 
surveillance strategies is undertaken.   
  
BioWatch Background 
  The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 
2002 (more commonly referred to as the “Bioterrorism Act”) was passed as Public Law 
107-188 on 12 June 2002 to improve the country’s bioterrorist readiness.  Since that time, 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has funded over $2.7 billion for 
public health preparedness efforts through grants administered by the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) and just over $1 billion for hospital preparedness grants 
administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (Schuler, 2004).  
Table 1 shows the major public health information technology initiatives undertaken to 
address concerns that generated the Bioterrorism Act.  BioWatch is a subset of the 
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Biological Warning and Incident 
Characterization System.   
 
 
 
 
Table 1- Major Federal Public Health Information Initiatives in Response to the 
Bioterrorism Act of 2002 (http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/). 
 3
  
During the 2003 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush 
announced that the federal government was "deploying the nation's first early warning 
network of sensors to detect biological attack." (Bush, State of the Union Address, 2003).  
He was referring to BioWatch.   
 
 Although overseen and funded by DHS, many organizations implement 
BioWatch.  In coordination with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the CDC 
and their members of the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), BioWatch provides 
early-warning surveillance for pathogenic agents at various cities around the country.  
The LRN is network of certified laboratories created to improve the nation’s public 
health laboratory infrastructure in both capability and capacity (CDC website, 2005).  
BioWatch is designed to detect and confirm the presence of biological agents within 36 
hours of a release as shown in Table 2.  
  
Table 2 - BioWatch Detection and Confirmation Timeline (Emory, 2005) 
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 The sampling collection details are performed by the EPA.  These duties are well-
suited to the EPA as the BioWatch air samplers are similar to, and sometimes co-located 
with the agency’s air quality monitors.  The analysis component of the program is 
overseen by the CDC.  The actual analysis is performed by members of the LRN.  
Finally, in the case of a positive identification of a harmful biological agent, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I) has lead jurisdiction (Shea, 2003).   
 
 Specific details regarding the schedule of sample collection and analysis, the 
particular agents analyzed for, and the location of detectors is understandably guarded for 
security reasons.    Sources report that BioWatch was unveiled in June 2003 and involves 
approximately five hundred air samplers in thirty-one cities that continuously collect air 
samples that are retrieved every twelve hours and analyzed for harmful biological agents 
(Kosal, 2003)1.  An analyst from the Congressional Research Service in the Library of 
Congress, Dana Shea, suggests, “The system tests for the pathogens that cause anthrax, 
smallpox, plague, and tularemia but the entire list of pathogens is not publicly available” 
                                                 
1 Sources report this collection time to vary between 12 and 24 hours depending upon the perceived threat 
and location.  Table 1.1 is taken from the Emory’s Inspector General report and states the maximum 
collection time to be 24 hours.   
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(Shea, 2003).   Government officials have indicated that the number of agents tested for 
is less than a dozen (Prior, 2004).  Although the exact number of agents tested for is 
unknown, the number is certainly finite.  It is likely that the six Category A agents 
identified by the CDC are tested for: anthrax, smallpox, tularemia, botulinum toxin, 
plague and agents that responsible for viral hemorrhagic fevers (CDC website, 2005).  
Definitions for the categories created by the CDC are described in Table 3 below.  
Table 3 - Biological agents as categorized by the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC website, 2005) 
CATEGORY DEFINITION EXAMPLE 
A Easily disseminated or transmitted from 
person to person, cause high mortality 
rates, and have the potential to disrupt 
both public health and social life 
Anthrax, Smallpox, 
Tularemia, Plague, 
Botulinum Toxin 
B Moderate in ease of dissemination and 
morbidity with a low mortality rate. 
Cryptosporidium, 
West Nile virus 
C Potential for high morbidity and 
mortality rates and can cause major 
health impact 
Rabies, Influenza 
 
 Regarding specific cities participating in the program, Shea reports Philadelphia,  
New York City, Washington, DC, San Diego, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, St. Louis, 
Houston, and Los Angeles are all members of the surveillance effort (Shea, 2003).  
 
Thermal Scanning Background   
The cornerstone of “A Hot Idea” is to recognize a signal, namely an elevation in 
body temperature, after the human body is introduced to a foreign biological agent.  The 
human body and its immune system sample the environment with every breath of air.  
Triggers to the immune system are automatic with the introduction of a foreign biological 
agent.  Sneezing and coughing initially attempt to physically remove the foreign agent.  If 
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needed, antibodies are produced and core temperatures are elevated as the body’s 
metabolic rate is increased to assist in the removal of the foreign agent.  It is the body’s 
response of increasing the metabolic rate and consequently elevating the body’s 
temperature that is key to “A Hot Idea.”  The response time and degree of temperature 
elevation vary depending upon the concentration and type of infectious agent the immune 
system is dealing with, but generally speaking, an increase will occur before an 
individual knows their body has been attacked by a biological agent.  Working with the 
workforce of a particular city, individual temperature profiles would be developed and 
monitored.  This workforce represents a group of "mobile samplers.”  As an example, the 
Washington D.C. workforce handling emergency response and postal duties consists of 
approximately 23,500 personnel (Armstrong, 2004). Police comprise the majority of this 
workforce with 12,110 personnel.  The rest of the workforce includes 150 parking 
enforcement workers, 4,900 firefighters, 5,940 mail carriers and 400 emergency medical 
service workers (Armstrong, 2004).  This workforce has a traceable daily route.  The 
workers’ core temperatures will be collected pre- and post- work shifts.  If one member’s 
core temperature varies significantly from a baseline temperature that has been 
established specifically for that individual, that person will be notified that he or she may 
be acquiring an illness – but work will continue as usual.  But, for example, if a 
predetermined statistically significant portion of individuals report temperatures 
abnormally above their specific temperature profiles, data management software will 
notify personnel of this anomaly.  Further investigation would be undertaken to 
determine the areas visited that day by the affected personnel and identify the source 
causing the elevation in temperature.   
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  One quick, non-invasive method of measuring body temperature utilizes an 
infrared thermal scan.  This approach was applied in airports in Singapore, Tokyo, Hong 
Kong, and Canada during the SARS epidemic of 2003 (Shea, 2003).   In Canada, 763,082 
arriving and departing people were scanned by thermal scanners sensing body 
temperatures greater than 38°C (St. John, 2005).  A Beijing report states that 30 million 
people were scanned for elevated temperatures during a 6 month period; 9,292 of these 
people were pulled aside to further investigate if personnel suffered from SARS.  Of 
these personnel, 38 were suspected SARS and 21 were confirmed SARS cases (Wu, 
2004).  “A Hot Idea” will subject a segment of a city's workforce to similar infrared 
thermal scans looking for clusters of workers with elevated temperatures.  These clusters 
would then undergo additional medical screening to identify the source of increased 
temperature.   
 
 Identifying the cause of the elevation in temperature will elucidate the responsible 
agent.  This will be true whether the agent is a Category A agent, an emerging infectious 
disease not yet identified, or a simple seasonal influenza virus.  BioWatch, on the other 
hand, will only notify personnel of the presence of a harmful agent if it is selectively 
screened for.  Dr. Stephen Prior, the Director for the National Security Health Policy 
Center of The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, suggests the number of agents 
screened for is somewhere between 6 and 12 agents (Prior, 2004). 
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The sensor used in “A Hot Idea” is uniquely selective to agents that will affect the 
human body.  This is true because the sensor is the human body.  Essentially, false 
positive results are eliminated:  anything that causes a response in the mobile sensor, or 
the workforce, will cause a similar response in the human body because they are one and 
the same.  Conversely, it could be argued that there is value in notification of, for 
example, a botched anthrax release.  If all the spores released in a bioterrorism event 
were too large to affect the human body (effectively removed by coughing and sneezing), 
there is still value in knowing there was an unsuccessful bioterrorist event.  “A Hot Idea” 
wouldn’t alert officials of this unsuccessful malicious release of biological agents, while 
the BioWatch analysis might.   
 
 By attempting to identify the causative agents of disease, “A Hot Idea” will 
identify both intentional releases of biological warfare agents and natural outbreaks of 
disease.  For example, the onset of the seasonal influenza or an emerging unknown 
infectious disease may be identified.  Both will most likely be natural outbreaks evading 
detection of the BioWatch system.  Advantages to positively identifying the onset of 
seasonal influenza include implementing final public health readiness issues, checking 
the viability of the current year’s vaccine, and commencement of educational and public 
awareness initiatives.  Advantages to positively identifying possible pandemic strains of 
influenza, such as avian influenza (“H5N1”) are many and discussed in an upcoming 
section.   
 
 9
 The location of samplers deserves consideration for “A Hot Idea” and BioWatch.  
Optimal placement of sampling equipment must be determined with the fixed BioWatch 
samplers.  The changing environmental conditions and the sometimes-strange interaction 
between high-rise buildings and winds present challenges to finding the optimal location 
to sample.  The workers of “A Hot Idea” on the other hand, travel traceable routes 
including exposure to both indoor and outdoor environments.  The workers thereby cover 
a greater geographical area than a number of stationary samplers.  If a cluster of workers 
shows abnormally high core temperatures, an investigation could be undertaken 
identifying the similar locations visited by those affected.  Conversely, in areas with large 
crowd densities such as stadium events and heads of states gatherings, stationary 
samplers could be brought in sample the atmosphere individuals are exposed to.   In this 
scenario, both methodologies might be considered for implementation 
 
Methodology 
BioWatch and “A Hot Idea” are compared and contrasted against each other and 
against the idea of a “do-nothing” approach.  This research determines a benefit – cost 
relationship between two different detection methodologies.  Aspects other than 
economic are also considered.  The principal goal listed on the Department of Homeland 
Security’s agenda is to “Increase overall preparedness, particularly for catastrophic 
events” (DHS website, 2005).  This research evaluated each detection system and a “do-
nothing” option in terms of that goal.   The accuracy of each detection method is 
evaluated by reviewing data collected from past BioWatch data, the SARS preparedness 
initiatives of 2003, and analysis of the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States.  
 10
Thermal screening data from manufacturers of thermal scanning units is used.  
Additionally, non-market factors not quantified with economic figures (such as 
acceptance of technology) is evaluated and incorporated into the analysis. Limitations of 
the both methodologies are discussed.  Areas such as the data management and the 
pathophysiology of increasing body temperature are covered.  Further discussion of these 
items clarifies a “proof-of-concept.”  Finally, considerations of a new emerging 
infectious agent, such as avian influenza, and the morbidity impacts are mentioned.  
 11
  
Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 The 2005 National Institute of Health (NIH) budget for biodefense spending was 
$1.7 billion (Enserink, 2005).  Since the anthrax attacks of 2001, annual funding for 
biodefense research has increased dramatically. “An Open Letter to Elias Zerhouni” 
published in the 4 March 2005 issue of Science challenged whether NIH was distributing 
these research dollars prudently.  Zerhouni is the head of the nation’s medical research 
institution, the National Institutes of Health (NIH).  The letter was signed by 750 U.S. 
microbiologists – including the president elect of the American Society of Microbiology 
(ASM) and seven past ASM presidents (Enserink, 2005).  Since 2001, there has been a 
1500% increase in funding grants for the NIH’s National Institute for Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases (NIAID) research exploring anthrax, plague, tularemia, glanders, 
meliodosis, and brucellosis (Altman, 2005).  In that same time, grants to study non-
biodefense–related agents have decreased by 41% (Altman, 2005).    Consider Table 4 
comparing the average number of cases of different diseases seen per year in the United 
States.   
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Table 4 - Average Number of U.S. Cases per year from 1996 – 2003                                         
by Disease Type (Altman, 2005). 
Biological Agent Average U.S. 
cases/yr 
Biological Agent Average U.S. 
cases/yr 
Tularemia 122 Tuberculosis 17,403 
Anthrax 3* Salmonellosis 42,457 
Plague 5 Shigellosis 23,567 
Glanders 0 Syphilis 38,007 
Melioidosis 0 Gonorrhea 346,765 
Brucellosis 103 Chlamydia 685,508 
* includes 22 bioterrorism- related events in 2001.  
 Many microbiologists, considering the financial distribution of research dollars 
and the prevalence of disease between biodefense- and non-biodefense agents, believe 
this is extremely one-sided.  These microbiologists believe the threat is not from the 
classic category A agents but from emerging infectious diseases.  Dr. Robert Armstrong, 
Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Center for Technology and 
National Security Policy, reports that between 1973 and 2003, an average of one new 
disease emerged annually.  Some of the more memorable diseases include Legionnaires’ 
disease in 1977, HIV/AIDS in 1981, West Nile Virus in 1999, and SARS in 2003 
(Armstrong, 2004). Avian influenza, commonly referred to as bird flu, could be the next 
on this list.   
 
 Many microbiologists believe a combination of four factors makes influenza 
potentially the most dangerous of all known viruses:  it crosses the species barrier readily; 
it can be very virulent, killing a high proportion of those infected; it is highly contagious; 
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and it can genetically recombine quickly into more dangerous strains (Financial Times, 
2005).   It is this ability to recombine quickly that is of concern with the H5N1 avian 
strain of influenza that has emerged in the Far East.   
 
 In its current form, the avian influenza virus does not present a great threat to 
humans because it is not readily transmissible between humans.   When humans do 
contract the disease though, fatality numbers are high:  the World Health Organization’s 
February 2006 report counts 93 deaths among 173 cases for a 53% mortality rate (WHO 
website, 2006).  However, if a human were to contract both H5N1 influenza and seasonal 
influenza, the viruses could genetically combine into a form with the virulence of H5N1 
and the human-to-human transmission characteristics of seasonal influenza.   In this 
scenario, morbidity and mortality rates would soar as a contagious and virulent virus is 
spread world-wide.  The word to describe this situation is “pandemic”; it comes from the 
Greek words for “all” and “people”’: “pan” and “demos”.  Pandemic differs from the 
word “epidemic.”   In Greek, “epi” means “upon”.  Epidemic is an outbreak upon a 
certain location, community or region.  If the location or region is the entire world then 
the world-wide epidemic could be called a pandemic.  
 
The CDC describes pandemic influenza occurring when “a new influenza A virus 
appears or “emerges” in the human population, causes serious illness in people, and then 
spreads easily from person to person world-wide (CDC website, 2006).   The CDC 
describes localized seasonal outbreaks, or epidemics, of influenza as seasonal influenza.   
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 Three influenza pandemics have occurred in the last century.  The worst of these 
was the 1918 pandemic which killed at least 20 million people (Gensheimer, 2003).  
Today a new avian influenza is presenting itself in the Far East: the H5N1 influenza 
virus.  This paper uses the terms “avian influenza” and “H5N1” interchangeably; a 
separate disease is seasonal influenza and should not be confused the former terms.  
Experts theorize that the new avian influenza virus has the potential to spread around the 
globe and become the next pandemic of influenza.  The estimated economic impact 
within the U.S. for the next influenza pandemic has been estimated as high as $166.5B 
USD (Balicer, 2005). The expected mortality toll in the United States is estimated to be 
89,000 to 207,000, with hospitalization numbers expected to be 314,000 to 714,000 and 
outpatient visits numbering between 18 million and 42 million (Gensheimer, 2003).         
 
Should We Care?   
Numbers above show the possible effects of such a virus.  They rival or exceed 
the numbers that would result in the case of a biological warfare attack.  As a biological 
agent, influenza is considered a Category C agent by CDC (see Table 3).  Considering the 
expected effects of pandemic influenza, is the H5N1 virus categorized correctly?  To 
further identify the possible severity of a pandemic avian influenza Gensheimer created 
Table 5 showing the similarities and differences between a bioterrorist event and a 
pandemic avian influenza.   
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Table 5 - Comparison between a Bioterrorist Event and                                                  
Pandemic Influenza (Gensheimer, 2003) 
Planning for pandemic influenza and bioterrorism: similarities and differencesa,b 
Issue Bioterrorist event Pandemic influenza 
Likelihood High High 
Warning None to days Days to months 
Occurrence Focal or multifocal Nationwide 
Transmission/duration of exposure Point source; limited; 
person-to-person 
Person-to-person, 6–8 wks 
Casualties Hundreds to thousands Hundreds of thousands to 
millions 
First responders susceptible? Yes Yes 
Disaster medical team support/response Yes No (too widespread) 
Main site for preparedness, response, recovery, 
and mitigation 
State and local areas State and local areas 
Essential preparedness components   
Surveillance Yes Yes 
Law enforcement intelligence Yes No 
Investigation Yes Yes 
Research Yes Yes 
Liability programs Yes Yes 
Communication systems Yes Yes 
Medical triage and treatment plans Yes Yes 
Vaccine supply issues Yes (for most likely threats) Yes 
Drug supply issues Yes Yes 
Training/tabletop exercises Yes Yes 
Maintenance of essential community services Yes Yes 
Essential response components   
Rapid deployment teams Yes No 
Effective communications/media relations 
strategy 
Yes Yes 
Vaccine delivery Yes (for some) Yes 
Drug delivery Yes (for most) Yes 
Hospital/public health coordination Yes Yes 
Global assistance Possibly Yes 
Medical care Yes Yes 
Mental health support Yes Yes 
Mortuary services Yes Yes 
Supplies and equipment Yes Yes 
Essential mitigation components     
Enhanced surveillance Yes Yes 
Enhanced law enforcement intelligence Yes No 
Vaccine stockpile Yes (selected agents) Prototype vaccines only 
Drug stockpile Yes Yes 
Pre-event vaccination Vaccination of selected 
groupsc 
Vaccination of groups at 
medical 
high risk with pneumococcal 
vaccined 
aDuring a catastrophic infectious disease event, such as an influenza pandemic, there may be critical 
shortages of vaccines and drugs. Thus, clinics set up to administer vaccines and distribute antimicrobial 
drugs may require the services of a range of personnel whose fields of expertise are nonclinical. Examples 
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of additional personnel that may be needed include law enforcement, translators, social workers, 
psychologists, and legal experts. 
bSource: Adapted from: National Vaccine Program Office. Pandemic influenza: a planning guide for state 
and local officials (Draft 2.1). Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; 2000. 
cAt the time of writing, the smallpox vaccination program was just beginning. For other bioterrorist agents 
for which vaccines are available (e.g., anthrax), limited supplies and concerns about safety profiles have, up 
to this point, effectively prevented the widespread use of these vaccines. 
dIt may eventually be possible to vaccinate high-priority groups and the general population with a yet-to-
be-developed “common epitope” vaccine, which might provide for a broader spectrum of protection against 
a variety of influenza A subtypes. 
Table citation: Gensheimer KF, Meltzer MI, Postema AS, Strikas RA. Influenza pandemic preparedness. 
Emerg Infect Dis [serial online] 2003 Dec [date cited].  
 
 
 Table 5 shows that H5N1 should not be confused with ordinary “seasonal 
influenza”.  Seasonal influenza typically occurs during the winter months with some 
years having higher illness (morbidity) and lethality (mortality) rates than other years.  
On average, 36,000 people die per year in the United States because of seasonal influenza 
(CDC website, 2006).  While this number is high, the potential loss of life from a 
pandemic strain of H5N1 is much greater.   
 
 To help avoid confusion between avian influenza and seasonal influenza, the 
scientific and public health communities are promoting the use of the term “H5N1” by 
the media when discussing the avian influenza disease.  This naming convention is being 
done to distinguish the “H5N1” virus from ordinary seasonal influenza and, hopefully, 
increase the urgency of research and education initiatives.  The CDC website explains 
that influenza viruses are categorized into one of three types: Type A, B, or C. Birds are 
the natural hosts to type-A influenza viruses and the H5N1 avian influenza reported in 
recent media reports is of the type-A variety (CDC website, 2006).  The specific 
nomenclature “H5N1” denotes different proteins on the surface of the virus.  The 
influenza type-A virus has 10 genes which encode for 11 proteins (Zubay, 2005).  The 
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“H” and the “N” stand for different subtypes of two of these proteins.  The “H” stands for 
hemagglutinin and the “N” for neuraminidase.  There are 15 different subtypes of 
hemagglutinin and 9 different subtypes of neuraminidase (Lee, 2004).  The subtype of 
protein on the influenza virus surface determines the name of that particular virus.  
Hence, the H5N1 virus has the 5th subtype of hemagglutinin and the 1st type of 
neuraminidase on its surface.  Both located on the influenza virus’s surface, 
hemagglutinin and neuraminidase are essential to the viron’s life cycle.  Hemagglutinin 
allows the virus to attach to the host cell’s plasma membrane and enter into the cytoplasm 
(Zubay, 2005).  Neuraminidase is responsible for releasing progeny viruses from host 
cells (Zubay, 2005).  The two other types of influenza, type-B and type-C, are not named 
according to subtype and are of lesser concern.  Type-B viruses occur only in humans but 
are not believed to be able to cause pandemic outbreaks (CDC website, 2005).  Type-C 
viruses only cause mild illness in humans and are not able to cause epidemics or 
pandemics (CDC website, 2005).   
 
Because of the potential toll that avian influenza presents to the economy and 
human lives (see Table 5), the U.S. should be concerned with H5N1.  Early detection of 
the avian influenza virus will be one key to minimizing the impact of a pandemic.   
 
Syndromic Surveillance and BioSense 
 Currently, emerging infectious diseases are often discovered when patients 
present at health-care facilities, such as clinics, hospitals, or physician offices.  In time, 
when large numbers of patients present similar symptoms, an astute medical professional 
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will recognize the similarities and investigate the causative agent.   This is often how an 
emerging infectious disease is discovered.  Using information technology to track similar 
symptoms presenting at multiple health-care facilities and highlighting this statistical 
spike is the idea behind syndromic surveillance.  Tying the different health-care facilities' 
data into one system and effectively monitoring data anomalies is a difficult task.  The 
CDC's BioSense program exists to address this need.   
 
 BioSense is under the Public Health Information Network program (see Table 1).  
The Public Health Information Network is a national initiative involving multiple 
organizations sharing information to identify outbreaks of disease.  Colleen Bradley, a 
public health analyst for the BioSense project, describes it as a CDC initiative, 
implemented in April 2004, to support enhanced early detection, quantification, and 
localization of possible biologic terrorism attacks and other events of public health 
concern on a national level (Bradley, 2005).  The focus is on earlier detection for the 
local and state public health agencies.  Earlier detection facilitates a more timely response 
and thereby mitigates the negative effects of a biological event.  Algorithms identify 
statistical anomalies in Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs 
ambulatory clinical diagnoses, in procedural data, and in Laboratory Corporation of 
America laboratory-test ordering data (Bradley, 2005).  Stratifying these data by location 
and time helps determine trends and clusters of disease that are emerging.   
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BioWatch 
 The U.S. government currently uses the system “BioWatch” as the basis for the 
country’s biosurveillance detection methodology.  DHS is responsible for deploying this 
system as part of the Biological Warning and Incident Characterization System.    
 
 BioWatch consists of an area air sampler that collects large volumes of air.  
Samples must be manually collected and transported to a laboratory.  Once in the 
laboratory, the air samples are analyzed for the presence or absence of harmful biological 
agents.  Sample analysis is performed on a regular basis.  The periodicity of sample 
collection and analysis is not made available to the public, but it can be assumed to be 
resource-intensive.   While the entire cost of the BioWatch program is unknown, the 
capital costs for installation in a single city are estimated at $1 million and the yearly 
budget for operation at $1 million per city (Shea, 2003).  Recent press reports have 
quoted higher costs; the total cost of BioWatch deployed to 31 cities has been cited as 
$60M (Charles, 2003).   The 2005 initiative to increase the number of cities participating 
in BioWatch is expected to increase the program cost to $118M (Charles, 2003). 
 
 This methodology only looks for a finite number of biological agents and will not 
identify an emerging strain that has not been previously identified.  Further limitations 
are discussed below.   
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BioWatch Limitations 
 When collecting air particulates, the size distribution is governed by the filter 
used to collect that sample.  This results in a wide variety of particle sizes collected.  
Some of these particles are of the size which the human body is susceptible to, but others 
are too small or too large to be of concern to the human body.  The natural defenses of 
the body effectively remove them and thereby render them harmless.   
 
 BioWatch collects air samples wherever the sampling devices are positioned.  
Theoretically, detectors would be placed in high-threat locations based on intelligence 
and locations based on prevailing weather conditions to optimize detector interaction 
with biological agent releases.  In reality, weather conditions change, resulting in 
suboptimal positioning of detectors.  Additionally, urban environments present unique 
environments with unusual air currents.  Depending upon the architecture of the city, 
eddy currents and dead spots may exist between buildings, further compromising the 
utility of fixed detector locations. 
 
 Samples collected are then analyzed for the presence of a biological agent of 
concern.  The Category A agents that the CDC has published as “the most easily 
disseminated or transmitted from person to person, cause high mortality rates, and have 
the potential to disrupt both public health and social life” are most likely screened for 
(CDC website, 2005).   Undiscovered emerging infectious diseases are not analyzed.   
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 Continuously sampling the environment for harmful biological agents has not 
previously been undertaken.  The EPA has deployed air samplers across the country and 
we commonly see the results of these activities in the weather section of the daily 
newspaper and on local news broadcasts.  Pollen count, smog indices, UV levels, and 
mold counts are examples of items that are monitored daily but continuous sampling for 
harmful biological agents has not been previously performed.  First, the scientific 
community has not identified the vast majority of organisms that exist on the planet 
today. Soil ecologists commonly state that they have perhaps identified one percent of the 
organisms living in topsoil; of the remaining 99 percent, most of the organisms are 
bacteria (Zelicoff, 2005).  A similar percentage of unidentified organisms exist in the air.  
It is unknown what continuous sampling results would yield – what are the agents that 
public health officials need to concern themselves with?  A second and larger problem 
has occurred at least three times since inception of the BioWatch program.   
 
In the winter of 2002, analysis of BioWatch samples identified at least one 
anthrax spore using polymerase chain reaction, a technique so specific that one spore of 
anthrax could result in a positive identification. Should one anthrax spore be of concern 
to the population of New York?  Past studies show that workers not immunized in wool 
mills could inhale several hundred spores daily without developing disease (Dahlgren, 
1960).    The subsequent actions were problematic.  A response procedure was not 
developed to deal with such an incident.  After analysis, no other BioWatch samplers 
tested positive for anthrax.  No spikes in syndromic surveillance were noted.  With no 
additional pieces of information, what was the appropriate action?  The anthrax 
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bacterium is endemic to many parts of the United States, especially where cattle farming 
operations occur.  A hardy spore-forming bacteria, Bacillus anthracis can remain viable 
in the soil for decades.  The natural background concentration of anthrax spores was 
unknown and so was the appropriate response.  In the end, no public notification took 
place and the source of the anthrax was not determined.  However, the positive anthrax 
identification did cost millions of dollars and many hours of the New York Department of 
Health's resources.   
 
In October 2003, BioWatch samplers again collected an agent of concern; this 
time the bacterium that causes tularemia.  The city was Houston, TX.  Indicative of a 
malicious release, three BioWatch units aligned in the path of predominant weather all 
tested positive.  Tularemia is endemic to the southwestern parts of the United States and 
has a reservoir of rodents and rabbits.  It is sometimes referred to as “rabbit fever” and is 
caused the bacterium Francisella tularensis.    The background concentration of 
tularemia in Houston was unknown; distinguishing between a natural event versus a 
malicious release was not possible.  Similar to New York, there was no agreed upon 
response plan.  The Houston Department of Health increased air sampling and examined 
local rodent and rabbits, considering them as a possible source.  In the end, the source of 
the three positive samples for tularemia remained unknown, but not before valuable time 
and resources were spent investigating the incident.   
 
Francisella tularensis was the agent of concern again in September 2005.  More 
than 6 BioWatch sensors picked up tularemia bacteria in the Mall area of Washington, 
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D.C on 25 September 2005, but the CDC was not notified for at least 72 hours after 
detection (Levine, 2005).   Asked why such a delay occurred, the director for the CDC’s 
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response, Richard 
Besser, stated because subsequent tests were not conclusively positive (Levine, 2005). 
 
All three of these examples are indicative of a limitation associated with the 
BioWatch response time.  Table 2 describes a maximum response time from release until 
detection of 36 hours.  These three examples show response times longer than this.  The 
point isn’t to dispute the use of subsequent testing to assure the validity of a detection of 
harmful biological agents.  Confirmational sampling is required to avoid unnecessary use 
of resources and undue alarm in the public.  The limitation is in reference to the benefit 
provided to society.  This paper quantifies benefit by the reduction in mortality due to the 
surveillance in place.  The reduction in mortality is heavily dependent upon the time to 
initiate response actions.  If actual response times are hindered due to confirmational 
testing requirements, estimates of mortality numbers will not be accurate nor will the 
societal benefit.    
  
Infrared Thermal Scanning   
Infrared radiation thermometry is now commonly used as a standard methodology 
to measure the temperature of the human body.  As a non-invasive approach, the infrared 
ear thermometer is both quicker and easier to use than oral thermometers.  This 
technology can also be applied in a mass screening mode measuring individual body 
temperatures quickly.  This use was employed to combat the outbreak of SARS in 2003.   
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 SARS caused 813 deaths in the 8,437 cases that were reported world-wide during 
6 months of 2003 (Wu, 2004).  The disease, with an average mortality of 10%, is 
communicable and was reported in 29 countries around the world (Wu, 2004).  The 
cardinal symptom of SARS is fever, but conventional means of measuring human body 
temperature with oral, and even ear, thermometers were slow and cumbersome.   
Attempting to control the spread of this epidemic, Singapore employed infrared 
technology to screen mass numbers of people in 2003.  The Singapore Ministry of Health 
(MOH) consulted with their Defense Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) who used 
their Sensor Systems Division (SSD) to find a solution (How Tan, 2004).  Within one 
week a prototype was built to measure large numbers of people quickly.  The Infrared 
Fever Screening System (IFSS) was released shortly thereafter.   
 
Infrared Fever Screening System with “A Hot Idea” 
The IFSS was implemented to identify individuals with fever with follow-up 
investigation to determine whether febrile persons had SARS.   Incorporated into “A Hot 
Idea,” IFSS would be looking for an elevation in temperature.  The distinction between a 
fever and an elevation in temperature is an important one in understanding the basis for 
“A Hot Idea.” 
 
A fever is commonly defined as measurable sign of infection; often a body 
temperature of 38°C or greater is cited as the threshold for fever. An elevation in 
temperature is one of the initial mechanisms the body responds with after becoming 
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inoculated with a foreign agent.  The rise in temperature could be to 38°C or higher, but it 
doesn’t have to be.  Any increase in temperature from an individual’s baseline 
temperature initiated by the immune system constitutes an elevation in temperature.  An 
elevation in temperature is before the onset of symptoms and signs of a fever because the 
individual does not recognize it as a fever nor does the medical community determine a 
fever through measurement.   Further discussion follows in the report regarding the 
pathophysiology of fever and the body’s mechanisms at work to elevate temperatures 
from the baseline temperature.   
 
Infrared Fever Screening System2
IFSS uses a two-tier detection concept to screen a large group of people for fever:  
the first is the detection of feverish individuals with the infrared technology; the second is 
confirmation testing with conventional means, i.e. oral or ear thermometers (How Tan, 
2004).  The IFSS measures exposed areas around the face of screened subjects where the 
blood vessels are relatively close to the surface of the skin.  These areas were determined 
to be areas around the temples, neck and a small patch of skin between the eyes and nose 
(How Tan, 2004).  Additional studies have focused on a specific location on the forehead 
and the inner corner region of the eyes because these areas are not normally covered by 
the subjects and have a temperature close to the body's core temperature (Ng, 2005).  The 
IFSS compares the infrared heat given off by a subject to the infrared heat given off by a 
separate thermal reference source (TRS). Calibrated and set to a pre-determined reference 
                                                 
2 Discussion of IFSS uses the correct term “fever” due to IFSS use during the 2003 SARS 
outbreak.  When incorporated into “A Hot Idea,” IFSS would be configured to look at the earliest elevation 
in temperature. 
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temperature, comparisons between the TRS and the subject are made.  Software converts 
the differences between the TRS temperature and the subject temperature and assigns 
different colors to represent different temperatures.  Red often signifies elevated 
temperatures above some threshold temperature (Wang, 2004).  The degree of increased 
temperature is indicated by the density of the red region and the amount of red surface 
area on the subject.  Figure 1 below shows the typical output by this type of infrared 
scanner.     
 
 
Figure 1 - Typical Output by Infrared Fever Screening System Type Thermal Scanner.  Left 
photo shows normal temperature; right photo show elevated temperature.  Notice the 
Thermal Reference Source in the background of both photos. (Wang, 2004) 
 
The relationship between one’s core temperature and skin temperature varies with 
the subject and the environmental conditions.  Understanding and correcting for these 
variables is paramount to assuring the accuracy and minimizing false positive and false 
negative screening results.  Human beings control their temperatures internally, although 
changes in temperature may occur through the physical processes of convection, 
conduction, radiation, and evaporation.  Figure 2 shows the proportional amount of heat 
loss through the different mechanisms.   
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Figure 2 - Human Heat Loss through Various Mechanisms (How Tan, 2004) 
 
Maintaining the body’s desired temperature is done through the endocrine system 
and a specific part of the brain called the hypothalamus.  The hypothalamus establishes a 
target temperature for the body to maintain.  For a healthy individual, a target 
temperature of 37°C is considered average; however each person has his or her own 
baseline temperature, usually between 36.4°C and 37.7°C (Prewitt, 2005).  Excluding 
illness or exercise-induced hyperthermia, a person’s body temperature varies less than 
1°C during their lifetime (Prewitt, 2005).  This temperature is the homeostasis 
temperature.  Homeostasis is a state of internal consistency in the body, or the normal 
range expected in a healthy individual.  Other average ranges for the body are a blood pH 
in the range of 7.35 – 7.45 and a blood glucose level of 75 – 110 mg / 100mL.  The body 
acts through different mechanisms that are negative feedback loops to maintain the target 
range.  A negative feedback loop involves an effector (generally a muscle or a gland 
releasing a hormone or an enzyme) whose purpose is to return the body to homeostasis.   
As the body returns to homeostasis the effector is no longer triggered by the body and the 
feedback loop is completed.  With body temperature, variations from the average 
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temperature of ~37°C are counteracted by different actions of the hypothalamus.  If the 
temperature is above the normal range for that body, the hypothalamus triggers the 
dilation of blood vessels and the activation of sweat glands to release body heat.  
Conversely, if the body temperature is too low, the body constricts blood flow to the 
extremities and, if necessary, induces shivering to raise the temperature back to the 
normal range.  A feedback loop shown in Figure 3 describes this process.   
 
 
Figure 3 - Hypothalamic Regulation of Human Body Temperature (How Tan, 2004) 
 
Limitations of the IFSS   
The thermoreceptors in the skin are more sensitive to rapid changes in 
temperature than to gradual changes and therefore the subjects should be acclimatized in 
a stable environment before being screened.  For example, subjects should not be 
screened immediately after entering a warm room from a cold environment.  (How Tan, 
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2004).  This may present challenges to “A Hot Idea” when commissioned workforce of 
policemen, firemen, and mail carriers return from cold outdoor environments after the 
conclusion of work shifts.   
 
How Tan notes that the IFSS requires subjects to be at or close to resting 
metabolic rate (How Tan, 2004).  Problematically, policemen, firemen, mail carriers and 
others may be ending their work shifts with elevated metabolic rates due to the duties 
performed that day.   
 
The body increases temperature when the hypothalamus detects pyrogens and 
raises the body’s baseline core temperature.  Pyrogens are proteins that result from the 
activity by the body’s immune system.  They can be exogenous (derived from invading 
microorganisms) or endogenous (derived by the body’s white blood cells).  The 
hypothalamus acts as the body’s thermostat and establishes a baseline temperature to 
maintain.  To initially elevate temperatures, the body constricts the flow of blood to the 
surface thereby minimizing heat loss.  The skin temperatures during this phase are not 
elevated and would not be detected by the IFSS.  This scenario increases the chance for a 
false negative.  The time course of a typical fever is shown in Figure 4. 
 
The following discussion of IFSS used the correct term “fever” due to its use 
during the 2003 SARS outbreak.  IFSS would be incorporated into “A Hot Idea” but 
would be configured to look at the earliest elevation in temperature. 
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Figure 4 - Time Course of Typical Fever 
 
Types and Limitations of Infrared Thermal Scanners 
  The IFSS is one type of thermal scanner (TS).  Wang evaluated more than 30 
thermal imaging systems.  Considering the different characteristics in terms of system 
set-up and working principle, Wang categorizes TS into four types. 
 
TS Type One. 
 The IFSS described previously is a Type One TS.  This type of thermal imaging 
system is comprised of a thermal imager and an thermal reference source (TRS).  The 
principle of measurement is the temperature difference between the subject and the TRS, 
which is set at a pre-determined threshold temperature. No quantitative temperature is 
shown with a type one TS; the delta between the external TRS and the body is the value 
of interest.  The threshold value of the TRS depends on empirical correlation between the 
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skin temperature and the body core temperature. Clinical trials collect the empirical data: 
a number of people with various body temperatures undergo thermal scans, and core 
temperature measurements using oral or infrared ear thermometers.  The skin thermal 
profiles referenced to the TRS setting are then studied.  The aim of the tests is to find the 
correlation between skin temperature and body core temperature and determine the 
temperature of the TRS (Wang, 2004).   
 
 One limitation of the Type One TS is the variance due to environmental 
conditions.  The temperature stability of the subject and the TRS is of concern when the 
system is not set up in an area with constant ambient conditions.  The location of the 
Type One TS must be in an area free from external drafts or disturbances in the air 
(Wang, 2004).  
 
TS Type Two. 
 A second type of TS quantitatively measures the temperature of a screened 
individual; an external TRS is not used in this configuration.  The thermal imager uses a 
quantitative camera and assigns a temperature to the subject.  A threshold isothermal 
temperature is determined and an alarm signals when a person's facial skin temperature is 
above this temperature.  Wang describes one manufacturer's recommendation to use 
multiple threshold settings.  In that case, the thermal imager is set to 16 different 
isothermal colors in increments of 0.5°C, thereby categorizing people into one of 16 
categories based on their temperature ranges (Wang, 2004).  Figure 5 below shows the 
typical output by a Type Two TS. 
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Figure 5 - Typical Output by Type Two Thermal Scanner.  Left photo shows slight             
fever of 37.7 degrees Centigrade; right photo show elevated temperature                                            
of 38.2 degrees Centigrade.  Reference temperature is 36.9 degrees                                                     
Centigrade in both photos. (Wang, 2004) 
 
 Significant drift of the detectors is a concern with the Type Two TS.  Self-
correction calibration mechanisms have been developed but the time required for these 
corrections may hinder throughput of the TS process.  Self-correction may also reduce 
the working life of the shutter mechanism (Wang, 2004).  Figure 6 below shows an 
example of drift problems that are associated with Type Two TS. 
 
Figure 6 - Typical Drift Seen with Type Two Thermal Scanner (Wang, 2004). 
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TS Type Three. 
 The third type of TS incorporates ideas from both the Type One and Two TS; an 
external TRS is used and temperature quantification is provided. Type Three TS are 
configured with a TRS that has two set-points, several degrees apart (Wang, 2004).  The 
TRS operates under the same principle as the Type One TS.  Typical output by a Type 
Three TS is in Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Typical Output by Type Three Thermal Scanner.  Note the two thermal reference 
sources shown at the bottom of the figure (Wang, 2004). 
  
Wang states that the Type Three TS has some problems with the initial  
calibration.  Operators pick a set of pixels of the TRS on their thermal cameras and assign 
a temperature to them.  TRS are not usually uniform in temperature and the selection of 
the particular pixels makes a great difference in overall system accuracy.  Additionally, 
the TRS are assigned temperature values by the manufacturer.  Unique environmental 
conditions may influence these temperatures away from the manufacture’s specifications 
and introduce measurement error.  (Wang, 2004).   
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TS Type Four. 
 The fourth type of TS incorporates a temporal thermometer to give a 
measurement of core temperature.  The system set-up is similar to the Type One TS, 
except the temporal thermometer measures temperature in a major artery (temporal artery 
on the side of the head) and thereby more accurately reflects the body's core temperature.  
The system uses the same TRS as the Type One TS.  The TRS is set to reflect the 
threshold temperature of a fever.  Measuring both subject and TRS temperatures at the 
same time, software packages can determine the difference between the temperatures and 
notify operating personnel of a fever. The Type Four TS also has software associated 
with it allowing differentiation between human faces and other warm objects.  In Figure 8 
notice the system's focus on the subject's forehead instead of the subject's hot cup.  Only 
one of the thirty thermal scanners Wang tested was a Type Four TS.    
 
 
Figure 8 - Typical Output by Type Four Thermal Scanner.  Note the core temperature 
reported and pixel identification focusing on the subject's forehead (Wang, 2004). 
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Parameters of Thermal Scanners 
Wang discusses several parameters that should be considered to ensure accuracy 
and statistically significant thermal scanner results.   The environment set-up, expected 
volume of personnel to be screened, training of operating personnel and other factors 
should be considered with the parameters discussed next to decide upon the most 
optimum TS unit.   
 
Thermal Drift.  
Minimizing thermal drift should be a goal when considering type two scanners.  
The drift is defined as the change of temperature during the time interval between self-
corrections (Wang, 2004).  The variance from the true temperature is another way to 
explain the drift.   
 
Minimum Detectable Temperature Difference.  
The Minimum Detectable Temperature Difference (MDTD) is the smallest 
temperature change that a TS is able to detect by a color change or, the temperature 
difference corresponding to a 5% to 95% target area color change (Wang, 2004).  The 
smaller the MDTD, the better the TS.  Wang considered MDTD values of 0.3°C to be 
good.  Some systems studied by Wang had MDTD of greater than 0.6°C.  To avoid the 
incidence of a false negative (i.e. person with an elevated temperature passing through 
the system undetected), the threshold has to be adjusted (lowered) by the MDTD.  For 
example, a system with a MDTD of 0.5°C and threshold temperature of 37.5°C would 
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have to lower the threshold temperature by the MDTD (0.5°C) to eliminate a false 
negative due to MDTD error.   
 
Non-uniformity.   
The parameter of non-uniformity concerns the temperature gradient across the 
plane of surveillance.  Ideally, the temperature would be isothermic and not vary across 
the target plane.  A small non-uniformity coefficient would offer more deployment 
options.  Manufacturers report non-uniformity measurements in a workable target plane 
as opposed to the system’s overall target plane.  The workable target plane is defined as 
2/3 of the size of the target plane (Wang, 2004).  Non-uniformity measurements in the 
target plane would be greater than those in the workable target plane.  Measurements are 
taken from the center, four corners and in-between the four corners of the workable target 
plane as indicated in Figure 11.  Measured non-uniformity measurements ranged from 
0.2°C to 2°C.  A TS with a non-uniformity measurement of 2°C means the same person 
could report temperatures of 38°C and 36°C dependent on whether the subject was 
located in the center or corner of the workable target plane.   
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 Figure 9 – Thermal Scanner Test Locations for Measurement of                                           
Non-uniformity Parameter (Wang, 2004). 
 
Distance Effect.   
This parameter involves the difference in temperature readings from a arbitrary 
distance.  A smaller distance effect results in more configurations and more versatile 
environments the TS system can be set up in.  Units with large distance effects can still 
be considered for use if the units are set up in a structured environment that reduces the 
distance to the TS such that a more reasonable and competitive distance effect can be 
achieved. 
 
Calibration/Stability of threshold temperature.   
The threshold temperature is a reference point that the TS uses to differentiate an 
elevated temperature from a average temperature (Wang, 2004).   The calibration of the 
reference temperature is traceable to a uniform standard, specifically the International 
Temperature Scale 1990 (ITS-90).  Ensuring a consistent reference point throughout the 
entire operation time is paramount to accurate screenings.  To determine the stability of 
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this reference temperature other parameters must be considered.  The non-uniformity of 
the TS must be accounted for; manufacturers often measure variance from the threshold 
temperature at the center of the target plane.  The location of the TRS in the target plane 
must also be considered for TS types Three and Four.  Wang reports that the established 
brands tended to demonstrate smaller errors.  Type One TS are not affected by this 
method of threshold setting because Type One TS thresholds are derived from clinical 
trials.   
 
Spatial resolution.   
The spatial resolution depends upon the size of the detector used.  Wang does not 
go into great discussion with this parameter except to say that an adequate number of 
pixels must be captured and analyzed by the detector.  If a cold spot on the subject is 
analyzed, the mean temperature of the individual could be skewed, thereby presenting the 
possibility of a false negative.   
 
All the parameters discussed have importance in facilitating a quick, efficient, and 
accurate thermal scanning process.  Of all the parameters discussed, Wang believes 
MDTD and non-uniformity to be critical parameters (Wang, 2004).  Wang analyzed more 
than 30 TS and found no outright configuration that was superior to the rest.   When 
selecting a TS unit for the screening of a commissioned workforce as described in “A Hot 
Idea”, all these parameters must be considered.  If the limitations of the particular TS are 
known ahead of time, the set-up configuration can be manipulated to minimize some of 
these shortcomings.  For example, ensuring the TRS is not in an area of changing 
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environmental conditions, minimizing the distance between thermal camera and subject, 
or using the central portion of the working target plane would minimize limitations of 
different TS units with their respective parameters.  
 
Economic comparison      
Society has expressed an interest in biosurveillance.  The post-9/11 world has 
introduced both a real and perceived threat to the U.S. public.  At the same time, nature 
continues to create new infectious agents for which the public must be prepared.  The 
belief that the discovery of antibiotics would lead to a disease-free society has been 
proven wrong.  Kathleen Gensheimer, Maine’s State Epidemiologist and Direct of 
Medical Epidemiology, and others in the scientific community, have expressed some of 
the possible effects that one emerging infectious agent, H5N1 avian influenza, could have 
on the U.S. society.   Better detection and identification methods for biological agents 
have been identified as a need but there are several ways to go about conducting this 
surveillance.   
 
Two such detection methodologies will be compared against a “do-nothing” 
approach in this paper.  The technology with greater economic value will be considered 
the superior methodology.  The economic analysis is discussed below.  After determining 
the superior methodology, there is an optimal amount of spending that can be invested 
before there is loss on investment.  To arrive at objective conclusions to these questions, 
economic tools are used.  Three types of analyses could be used to evaluate different 
approaches: Benefit-Cost, Cost-Effectiveness, and Cost-Utility studies.   
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 Different Economic Approaches   
The Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) is described as the “gold standard” by many 
applied economists (Meltzer, 2001).  All costs and benefits are measured with economic 
terms and are adjusted to a net present value for future years.  Simply stated, if the net 
present value of the benefits outweighs the net present value of the costs, that strategy is 
said to have an overall positive net present value.  This analysis approach is particularly 
useful when comparing two different options; the one with the larger net present value is 
considered the superior option. 
 
Both the Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) and the Cost-Utility Analysis (CUA) 
analyses consider the benefits in terms other than monetary units.  The CEA might 
deliver an output in particular units of a health outcome (e.g. lives saved) (Meltzer, 
2001).  The CUA incorporates a value for the quality of life ranging between 0 and 1.  
For example, an individual that loses a leg is considered to have a lower quality of life 
than an individual that has partial use of a leg, which is still less than a person with two 
healthy legs.  Neither the CEA nor the CUA deliver an output in strict economic terms.  
Additionally, the CUA is better suited for chronic conditions.  To arrive at an objective 
evaluation with economic terms on a societal basis for acute illnesses, the Benefit-Cost 
analysis was chosen for this study.   
 
BioWatch costs an estimated $1M to deploy to a city and an additional $1 million 
dollars annually for operations and maintenance (Emory, 2005).  Alternatively, the costs 
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Canada incurred for operating thermal scanning units in 2003 are reported at $66,667 per 
unit annually for rental costs (The Vancouver Sun, 2003).  Personnel, and operation and 
maintenance, costs were reported at $700,000 per unit annually (The Vancouver Sun, 
2003).  In the simplest form, if both of the detection methodologies had the same 
accuracy and early-detection timetables for all biological agents, the methodology with 
the lower capital and amortized costs would provide a greater net benefit to society than 
the methodology with the higher capital and amortized costs.  The methodology with the 
greater net benefit to society would then have to be compared with a “do-nothing” 
approach.  If the surveillance costs exceed the “costs avoided”, the “do-nothing” 
approach would be warranted.  Alternatively, if the averted costs exceed the surveillance 
costs, biosurveillance would be warranted.  Additionally, since BioWatch is currently 
operating in 31 cities across the county, sunk costs must be considered.  Comparing the 
two methodologies will depend on whether BioWatch has been previously deployed to 
the geographic area of interest.  Anthrax is one agent that both methodologies would 
likely have comparable early-detection times and accuracy.   
 
If, however, an emerging-infectious disease not screened for under standard 
sampling and analysis BioWatch protocols is considered, a more rigorous analysis is 
required.  Market-based economic terms can predict objective overall benefits.  Simply 
stated, market-based value is a price range for which the market will buy or sell a service 
or good.  For example, there is a market-based value for a professor:  universities have 
demonstrated a willingness to pay some amount of money for the services of a professor 
with certain qualifications and, at the same time, professors have agreed to provide those 
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services for this same range of salary.  Similarly, there are market based values for all 
goods, services, and individuals’ time including: visits to medical facilities, prescription 
and non-prescription drugs and days missed from work.  Additionally, there are market 
based values for an individual’s life considering a range of values an individual is 
expected to experience in their lifetime.   
 
The perspective of the costs associated with the analysis must also be considered.  
From the perspective of an individual, the benefit of having early notification of an 
infectious outbreak is the costs saved due to a decreased risk of contracting the disease.  
The benefit realized by the individual can be estimated as the diminished chance of 
contracting illness which would have resulted in costs associated with lost time from 
work, travel associated with visits to a physician, and co-payments.  The benefit realized 
by the health insurance provider would include the cost avoidance from a visit to the 
physician, but would not consider savings associated with the patient’s travel time saved 
or their social engagements kept.  Conversely, the health insurance company could 
realize a negative-benefit due to early notification of the presence of H5N1:  “worried-
well” patients may present en masse to health care facilities requiring reimbursement 
from the insurance company.   Different again, pharmaceutical companies may realize a 
profit from early notification due to a large demand for pre-treatment drugs.  Or would 
the profit losses associated with a smaller illness rate result in less overall pharmaceutical 
products being prescribed?   Meltzer discusses this issue and concludes that policy 
makers often contend with the perspective issue.  In the end, they often focus on the 
benefit from a total society perspective.  “Adding up all the costs and benefits 
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irrespective of who pays and who benefits … societal perspective is the most 
comprehensive one; all others are subsets of the societal perspective (Meltzer, 2001).”   
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Chapter 3 – Methodology  
Economic Impact Considerations 
The economic impact attributed to the release of a biological agent should be 
quantified to develop sound prevention measures.  The impact of a bioterrorist attack 
depends on many factors.   Characteristics of the agent, the delivery method, the 
population exposed and the response reaction by both emergency responders and society 
as a whole all influence the magnitude of an event involving the release of a biological 
agent.  
 
The number of people exposed and the virulence of the agent are two important 
criteria to consider.  Virulence is attributed to the specific agent; Bacillus anthracis 
possesses a different virulence than Francisella tularensis.  The virulence is also affected 
by the atmospheric conditions and size distribution of the agent.  For example, to 
efficiently enter the lungs, anthrax spores must be between 1 μm and 5 μm in diameter 
(Reshetin, 2003).  If the spores are smaller than this diameter, they will be inhaled and 
then immediately exhaled without being deposited in the alveolar region of the lungs.  
Spores greater than 5 μm will be trapped in the nose hairs and mucous linings of the nose 
and throat; they will be expelled without lodging in the lungs and causing disease.  
Additionally, the spore size distribution may be between 1 μm and 5 μm but the spores 
may agglomerate together and settle out of the atmosphere faster than a “weaponized” 
version of the agent.  The Journal of the American Medical Association described the 
Hart Senate anthrax powder of 2001 as “weapons grade” and “exceptional” in that it had 
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a high spore concentration, uniform particle size, low electrostatic charge, and had been 
treated to reduce clumping (Matsumoto, 2003).   
 
The method used to distribute the agent will also influence the effects of a 
biological release.  Distribution characteristics concern both the mechanism used to 
deliver the agent (e.g. subway release, aerial sprayer, introduction into a ventilation 
system, etc.) and the environmental conditions (e.g. wind speed, temperature inversion, 
disinfecting ultraviolet light intensity, etc.). 
 
Characteristics of the population also influence the magnitude of the event.  The 
population’s immunity to the disease is one important consideration.  The time between 
exposure and receiving medical attention, to include pre-exposure prophylaxis, is also 
important.  Kaufmann states this is the single most important factor influencing the 
economic impact of biological agent release (Kaufmann, 1997).  The amount of 
“worried-well” in the population using limited medical resources (including limited 
facility space, medical manpower, equipment, and pharmaceuticals) will influence the 
magnitude of the event.   
 
Wein Model 
All of the characteristics discussed above are dwarfed when considering 
variations in the size of the release.   Lawrence Wein from Stanford's Graduate School of 
Business, David Craft from Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Operations Research 
Center, and Edward Kaplan from Yale's Department of Epidemiology and Public Health 
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produced a model to predict the outcome of a 1 kg release of anthrax concentrated at 1 
trillion spores per gram in a city of 10 million inhabitants.  For comparison, New York 
City has a population of 8.1 million inhabitants and a metropolitan population of 18.6 
million (City Population website, 2005).  Other cities with metropolitan populations close 
to 10 million are Los Angeles and Chicago with 12.8 and 9.3 million inhabitants, 
respectively (City Population website, 2005).  The study uses a system of models to 
address different facets of an attack.  An atmospheric dispersion model, an age dependent 
dose-response model, a disease progression model and a model simulating the volume 
expected at medical facilities specifically for antibiotic distribution and hospital care 
were all used to generate an output quantifying the impact of an anthrax release.  A 
graphical depiction of Wein’s system is presented in Figure 10 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 - Graphical Depiction of the System of Models Used to Quantify the Impact of an 
Anthrax Release (Wein, 2003). 
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The atmospheric dispersion model used by Wein is a Gaussian plume model 
identical to the one used in the paper titled The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979 
(Meselson, 1994).   
 
Sverdlovsk Anthrax Incident 
The anthrax incident in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics town of 
Sverdlovsk is the most deadly anthrax epidemic known in modern times; at least 68 
people died (Wampler, 2001).   The incident and size of release remain controversial 
today.  The Soviet Union claimed a natural outbreak of anthrax and subsequent ingestion 
of anthrax contaminated meat as the responsible cause for the cluster of deaths in 1979.  
The United States, on the other hand, believed the Soviet Union was in violation of the 
1972 biological weapons convention.  The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) asked 
Harvard biologist Matthew Meselson to examine the evidence and determine release 
characteristics (Wampler, 2001).  In the end, Meselson reported that the outbreak was a 
result of a daytime aerosol release from a military facility on Monday 2 April 1979 
(Meselson, 1994).  The weight of the spores released was reported “as little as a few 
milligrams or as much as nearly a gram” (Meselson, 1994).   This is the same base model 
that Wein uses to predict outcomes of a 1kg anthrax release in a large city.  It should be 
noted that Meselson’s model output was contested by U.S. biological weapons experts; 
they believed his estimate to be low.  Thirty-year biological weapons researcher, Dr. 
William C. Patrick, an expert on anthrax dispersal, stated he and other experts “hooted” 
when Meselson presented his low estimate (Miller, 2002).  Dr. Ken Alibek, the former 
deputy director of the Soviet biological warfare operation Biopreparat, now working for 
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U.S. intelligence sources, backed the U.S. position stating that the Sverdlovsk military 
facility was one of the Soviet Unions busiest production plants for anthrax production, 
“working around the clock, in three shifts” (Miller, 2002).   Alibek explained the 
enormity of the Soviet program in testimony to the 106th Congress: “Hundreds of tons of 
anthrax weapon formulation were stockpiled, along with dozens of tons of smallpox and 
plague. The total production capacity of all of the facilities involved was many hundreds 
of tons of various agents annually” (Alibek, 2000). 
 
The aim of the Wein paper was to determine the most effective manner to 
distribute antibiotics and hospital care to those showing symptoms of anthrax disease and 
those who are asymptomatic (including both the "worried-well" and those who are yet to 
show symptoms).  Wein used a threshold parameter p that determines the fraction of all 
inhabitants that receive antibiotics in a time-varying geographical ring that grows as the 
fraction of inhabitants displaying symptoms exceeds p (Webb, 2003).  Ideally, all 
personnel will receive antibiotic prophylaxis, regardless if they are symptomatic or not.  
Even in this idealized scenario, deaths are expected to be 100,000 for a city of 10 million 
when response is undertaken at 48 hours after release of anthrax (Wein, 2003).  
Conversely, if antibiotic treatment is withheld until personnel are symptomatic, deaths 
are expected to be 7 fold higher, or around 700,000 (Wein, 2003).  
 
Value of Statistical Life  
Using these mortality numbers, the value of lives lost can be calculated.  
Numerous studies have been conducted determining an accurate value to put on human 
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life, specifically for purposes of evaluating public policy decisions.   Executive Orders 
12044, 12291, and 12866 by Presidents Carter, Reagan and Clinton have all mandated 
economic impact analyses of all significant Federal Regulations (Viscusi, 2003).  
Initially, values were arrived at considering factors such as lost work hours and medical 
costs.  This approach was used to review the benefit of implementing Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Hazard Communication regulation in 1982.  
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) rejected the regulation on the basis of 
costs exceeded the benefits.  OSHA disagreed with this; thinking that the benefit (the 
value of a human life) was too sacred to put a value on, and appealed to then Vice-
President Bush.  Harvard Law School professor, W. Kip Viscusi, was consulted to settle 
the disagreement between the two agencies.  Viscusi used a different approach to 
determine the value of life: the Value of Statistical Life (VSL) methodology.  Using this 
methodology, the value of life is increased by approximately an order of magnitude.  
With a new value, the Hazard Communication regulation was passed (Viscusi, 2003).  
Subsequent economic analyses have continued to use the VSL methodology.   
 
The actual value of the VSL was determined by taking the mean of 26 different 
economic studies; the EPA arrived at a VSL of $6.3 million dollars per person adjusted to 
the year 2000 (Viscusi, 2003).    Other VSLs are used by different organizations for 
economic studies; however, since the EPA is responsible for the most costly Federal rule-
making in the U.S. government, the EPA number is used in this study (Viscusi, 2003).   
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Using the EPA VSL of $6.3 million and Wein’s model’s estimate of between 
100,000 and 700,000 deaths (depending upon antibiotic supply and distribution) from an 
anthrax attack with a response initiated at 48 hours after release, the societal economic 
cost would be between $6.30 x 1011 and $4.41 x 1012 (or $630B and $4.41T).   This is the 
cost associated with the expected mortalities due to a release of 1 kg of anthrax 
concentrated at 1 trillion spores per gram in a city of 10 million people with no 
biosurveillance measures in place.   
 
BioWatch Benefit – Cost 
The societal benefit of surveillance, specifically BioWatch, is difficult to 
establish.  First, the cost of establishing surveillance has to be determined.  No specific 
quotes have been published, but estimates have been made.  Shea reports that the initial 
investment for a city is approximately a $1M dollar capital cost, with an additionally 
$1M per year required for operation and maintenance costs (Shea, 2003).   This is a 
conservative figure; higher costs have been estimated.  Probably the most accurate 
figures come from communication with Dr. Jeff Stiefel, Program Manager for BioWatch 
with the Department of Homeland Security.  Stiefel stated that Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 
funds allocated for the program were $60M; these funds were for the start-up of the 
program in approximately 31 cities (Stiefel, 2005).  FY 2004 and FY 2005 allocations 
were $38M and $60M, respectively; these investments cover day-to-day operations 
(Stiefel, 2005).   
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Consider this cost of providing surveillance with the reduced number of 
mortalities expected.  The advertised capabilities of the BioWatch system are to detect 
and confirm the presence of biological agents within 36 hours of a release (Emory, 2005).  
Stiefel communicates the ability to know of an attack is within 27 – 36 hours.  What 
reduction in severity can be expected due to a shift from 48 hours in the model developed 
by Wein to the 27 to 36 hours response expected if BioWatch is in place?   Wein reports 
that his model does not predict a markedly reduced number of deaths by rapid detection: 
if the detection delay is reduced to 6 hours after release, 70,000 deaths can still be 
expected (down for 100,000 with a 48 hour detection time) with optimal distribution of 
antibiotics (Webb, 2003).  Conversely, for the same “optimal pharmaceutical 
distribution” scenario, a detection time of 4.8 days (115.2 hours) causes the model to 
predict a doubling of the number of deaths from 100,000 to 200,000 (Wein, 2003).   
Wein’s data points are plotted in Figure 11 below.   
Wein Extrapolation
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Figure 11 –Dr. Lawrence Wein’s Model for t=6 hours, 48 hours, and 115.2 hours with 
Logarithmic and Linear Fit Equations (Wein, 2005) 
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 Using these numbers, a response time that is shortened from Wein’s 48 hours to 
the BioWatch advertised time of 27-36 hours would result in an expected mortality of 
below 100,000 but above 70,000.  Fitting an exponential curve to Wein’s datapoints, 
equation (1) results: 
 
(eq.1)   y = 24055 ln (x) + 43747 
 
Where “y” represents the mortality number expected and “x” represents the time 
in hours until response activities are started.   
 
With only three data points, the fit curve has an R2 value of 0.83.  The R2 value is 
a coefficient of determination and represents the proportion of the total sample variability 
around the mean of “y” that is explained by the linear relationship between “y” and “x” 
(McClave, 2005).  R2 is sometimes referred to as a “goodness of fit”; the higher the R2 
value, the better fit between the model (fitted curve) and the data.   An R2 value of 0.83 is 
not particularly high, however, a linear equation fit to Wein’s data points, yields equation 
(2) with a very similar r2 value of 0.82.  Equation (2) is given below:  
 
(eq.2)   y = 1810.3 (x) 
 
Where “y” again represents the mortality expected and “x” represents the time in 
hours until response actions are undertaken.    
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 Epidemic curves of disease often present in logarithmic fashion; additionally 
Wein’s model assumes a log-normal incubation period.  Without a significant 
improvement to the goodness of fit using a linear best-fit line, the logarithmic equation is 
the preferred modeled equation.   Simplifying this, two of Wein’s datapoints are acting as 
boundary conditions to the times of interest in this paper.  Stated otherwise, Wein’s 
model was run for 4 hours and 115.2 hours; the mortalities of interest in this paper are 
included within this range.  Therefore, picking points directly off of the Wein curve is the 
easiest, most accurate, and therefore, the preferred method available.   
   
The arithmetic mean of the BioWatch response time range is 31.5 hours.  Using 
this value for “x,” the expected mortality number is 86,600 deaths.   The economic 
severity associated with this number is $5.46 x 1011 ($546B).  This is an economic 
savings of $84B when compared to the $630B in economic costs predicted when having 
no biosurveillance system in place.   
 
 The net returns from a biosurveillance system can be quantified by subtracting the 
cost of surveillance from the savings averted in the population.  Equation (3) represents 
this as:  
 
(eq.3)  Net Returns = Savings from Costs Averted in Population – Cost of Surveillance 
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Using the numbers above, the net returns for the BioWatch surveillance system 
for the anthrax scenario described is a savings of $84B minus a negligible start-up and 
operation and maintenance costs  (Shea’s numbers are $1M and $1M, respectively; 
Stiefel’s numbers are $1M and $2M, respectively – all of which are negligible when 
subtracted from the savings of $84B).  Therefore, the net savings provided by an 
established and operational BioWatch system in city where 1 kg of anthrax is released 
that behaves as modeled by Wein’s Gaussian plume is $84B.  This analysis is contingent 
upon an anthrax attack occurring within the first year of providing surveillance; this is not 
the case.   
 
The accurate statistical likelihood of an anthrax attack is difficult to determine or 
locate in open source (i.e. not classified) literature.  If the attack probability is 1 in a 100 
(or one attack in 100 years) or 1 in a 1000 (one attack in 1000 years), the costs averted in 
equation (2) would be multiplied by 0.01 or 0.001, respectively.  Doing so results in a 
BioWatch net return of $840M if the probability of an anthrax attack is 0.01; net returns 
for a 0.001 probability event are $84M.   The capital, and operation and maintenance 
costs, are no longer negligible.  From an economic perspective, a negative net return 
occurs when the cost to provide surveillance is greater than the costs avoided by having 
surveillance in place.  In other words, the economic outcome is cheaper when not 
providing surveillance than when providing it.  Conservatively assuming New York City 
has twice the average number of BioWatch units deployed results in a $2M start-up cost 
and a $3M annual operation and maintenance (O&M) cost.  Using these numbers, 
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BioWatch system would return a negative net return after 28 years without an anthrax 
attack.    
 
“A Hot Idea” Benefit – Cost 
Considering “A Hot Idea” surveillance, with the same anthrax scenario described 
and the same likelihood of anthrax attack, would differ in two ways.  First, initial costs of 
the infrared thermal scanning units and their operation and maintenance costs are 
different.  Secondly, different costs would be averted due to an earlier or later notification 
time than BioWatch’s 27-36 hours, thereby producing a smaller or greater mortality 
number.  
 
The rental cost of infrared thermal scanning units have been quoted at $33,333 per 
unit, per year while personnel costs to perform operation and maintenance are $350,000 
per unit, per year (The Vancouver Sun, 2003).   These costs were from the deployment of 
six thermal scanners at both the Toronto and Vancouver international airports during the 
SARS outbreak of 2003.   
 
The City of New York employs 40,710 uniformed police and 16,015 fire and 
emergency medical service personnel (Keilin, 2001).  Additionally there are 21,116 
postmen who work in the city’s five boroughs; 9,107 of them are letter carriers (Mitchell, 
2006).  The total number of uniformed police, fire and emergency medical service 
workers, and letter carriers is 65,832.  The police department of New York City is 
divided into 76 different precincts (NYC gov. website, 2005).  Each precinct participating 
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in “A Hot Idea” would require one thermal scanning unit.  The fire department has 141 
fire stations throughout the city.  Each participating fire station would require one thermal 
scanning unit.  Finally, there are at least 131 post office facilities (Donohue, 2004) in 
New York City, each participating facility requiring one thermal scanning unit.   The total 
number of police precincts, fire stations and postal facilities in New York is 348.    
 
Assuming the commissioned workforce is equally distributed across the city, 50% 
of the commissioned workforce works from 50 % of the commissioned workforce 
buildings.  Therefore, 174 thermal scanning units are required to provide surveillance to 
half of the city’s workforce, or 32,916 city personnel.  At $33,333 per unit, the annual 
cost for equipment is $5.8M.  The O&M cost for this equipment is $60.9M.  Together 
these figures equal $66.7M for equipment and operation and maintenance costs per year 
for the city and scenario described.    
 
Similar to the BioWatch calculation, the time to notification needs to be 
determined to estimate the mortality using equation 1 above.  “A Hot Idea” is based upon 
the idea that an increase in body temperature will be one of the first responses at onset of 
infection.  With an absence of data regarding the sentinel response of the human body 
after inoculation, consider the epidemiological data.   
 
The epidemiological data for inhalational anthrax is limited and varied.  The most 
recent data is from the 2001 bioterrorist events in the United States.  Fever, chills, 
malaise, and fatigue were the initial symptoms reported in all ten cases occurring in 
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October and November of 2001 (Henderson, 2002).  The range between exposure and 
onset of symptoms (defined as influenza-like symptoms: fever, chills, drenched sweats, 
gastrointestinal complaints, headache, cough, and chest pain) for inhalational anthrax 
during the bioterrorism related attacks of 2001 was from four to six days, with a median 
of four days (Bartlett, 2002).   This is referred to as the incubation period.   Defined in the 
Control of Communicable Disease Manual, “incubation period” is the time interval 
between initial contact with an infectious agent and the first appearance of symptoms 
associated with the infection (Chin, 2000).  The validity of this 2001 data is not 
questionable, however the small numbers of patients affected is concerning; there were 
11 cases, and data was collected from 10 of the 11.  Discounting the 2001 bioterrorism 
attacks, there have been 18 reported cases of inhalational anthrax in the United States in 
the last 100 years (Barlett, 2002).  Data was not collected or kept for most of these 
intermittent cases.  The Sverdlovsk data is the only other source of epidemiological data 
of humans but the 1979 Russian anthrax release is clouded with uncertainty.  The median 
duration between exposure and onset of symptoms for the anthrax release the Sverdlovsk, 
Russian incident in 1979 was 19.5 days (Bartlett, 2002).  The data set is larger for the 
Russian release but its quality is suspect.  Meselson reports 68 of the 79 patients with 
inhalational anthrax died in the incident (Meselson, 1994).  Another report says 358 
people were ill with 45 dead; another recorded 48 deaths among 110 patients (Henderson, 
2002).    This variation in reported numbers and the lack of available and timely reports 
from the former Soviet Union brings the quality of data into question.  Other reliable 
sources for anthrax information are the Control of Communicable Diseases Manual, by 
the American Public Health Association (APHA) and the USAMRIID Blue Book, by the 
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United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases.  These books 
quote incubation periods for anthrax to be between 1 – 6 days and 1 – 7 days, 
respectively (Chin, 2000 and USAMRIID, 2004).  The Blue Book footnotes their 
incubation period with a note:  “During an outbreak of IA [inhalational anthrax] in the 
Soviet Union in 1979, persons are reported to have become ill up to 6 weeks after an 
aerosol release occurred. Studies performed in nonhuman primates confirm incubation 
periods which can be up to 100 days” (USAMRIID, 2004).   
 
The varying reported incubation periods make a singular choice difficult.  Using 
the median incubation time from the 2001 attacks is one approach.  A 4 day incubation 
period is greater than the 48 hours Wein used in his model which generated a mortality of 
100,000.  Reading the ordinate off of Wein’s curve at 96 hours gives a mortality of 
172,000.  Using the EPA’s VSL (value of statistical life) of $6.3M, the cost associated 
with this expected mortality is $1.08T.  This is $450B more than the fatalities expected 
from Wein’s output using his time from release to response of 48 hours.  Therefore, only 
considering a 4 day response, Wein’s model as the basis for comparison, and considering 
optimal pharmaceutical distribution, the costs associated with implementing “A Hot 
Idea” do not return a positive net return.  These scenario details however, would probably 
not unfold in such a manner.  At some time before the median incubation period, some 
portion of personnel enrolled in “A Hot Idea” would present with an elevated temperature 
and identify the need for further investigation. 
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The term “symptom” is used to describe a condition reported by the patient.  A 
“sign” differs from a “symptom;” a sign is a physical finding made by a physician.  
Although all 10 patients experienced the symptom of a fever, only 7 of the 10 patients 
had signs of a fever above 37.8°C.  This is an important distinction.  Although the 2001 
bioterrorism attacks are a small data set, if “A Hot Idea” was looking for temperatures 
above 37.8°C, 30% of those infected would be missed.  In this case, workforce personnel 
should be told to report to the “workplace clinic” if they are feeling feverish regardless of 
infrared temperature measurements.   
 
 Alternatively, considering the more realistic lower range of the incubation time of 
1 day results in an expected morality of 84,300.  The ranges cited by both USAMRIID 
and the APHA are 1 - 6 and 1 - 7 days, respectively.  This equates to a cost avoidance of 
$99B.  As was done for the BioWatch analysis above, this savings of $99B is true if an 
anthrax attack is certain within the year being considered.  This is not the case and is 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine the likelihood of an attack.   
 
If the attack probability is 1 in a 100 (or one attack in 100 years) or 1 in a 1000 
(one attack in 1000 years), the costs averted in equation (2) would be multiplied by 0.01 
or 0.001, respectively.  Doing so results in “A Hot Idea” net return of $990M if the 
probability of an anthrax attack is 0.01; net returns for a 0.001 probability event are 
$99M.   Considering a rental and O&M cost of $66.7M per year, “A Hot Idea” would 
yield a negative net return after 15 years without an anthrax attack if the probability of 
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attack is 0.01.  A negative net return would result after two years if an attack whose 
likelihood is 0.001 did not occur.   
 
The early estimates of fever from USAMRIID and the APHA are 24 hours. This 
time seems reasonable because a portion of a monitored workforce will be present with 
fever in this early period of disease progression.  If this time could be shortened even 
further, the benefit of “A Hot Idea” would increase again.  Assuming a 12 hour response 
time due to the specificity garnered by developed individual temperature profiles is not 
unreasonable.  At 12 hours, the expected mortality is 77,100.  Savings are $1.44B and 
$144M for 0.01 and 0.001 probability events.  Considering the same rental and O&M 
cost, “A Hot Idea” yields negative net returns after 22 years and 3 years for 0.01 and 
0.001 probability events.   
 
Limitations of Data 
 Some issues with the quality of the data behind these economic numbers have 
been mentioned previously (e.g. Sverdlovsk data reliability, small sample sizes, etc.).  
Although tractable and well-referenced, the economic analysis is heavily dependent upon 
Wein’s model and limitations of modeling must be considered.  Although the difference 
between a detection time of 6 hours and 48 hours was stated as “not markedly different,” 
it can be argued otherwise.  The difference between 70,000 deaths and 100,000 deaths is 
30,000 deaths; this is still a magnitude of death averted that deserves significant 
consideration and appreciation.  The quantity, or availability, of data should also be 
addressed.  There is a lack of available data for a variety of reasons.   
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 BioWatch Data Limitations. 
 BioWatch surveillance is a sensitive subject; specific agents screened for, 
locations of surveillance, and the scheduled time intervals between analysis of samples 
are all closely-held  information for obvious reasons.  The cost to maintain and operate 
BioWatch is also difficult to accurately quantify because budget numbers for biodefense 
are not broken out by methodology but rather by the specific Departments of the federal 
government that operate the methodologies.  Within these departments, data is further 
clouded by categorizing line items with vague headings.  For example, The Department 
of Homeland Security combines their budget numbers for BioWatch with the Homeland 
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) initiatives and “other” research 
efforts.  The line item in their published budget data combines these efforts under 
“Biological Countermeasures;” finding further breakdown is difficult.    
 
“A Hot Idea” Data Limitations. 
 Data for “A Hot Idea” also presented a challenge to obtain.  This methodology 
has not been fielded to date and system set-up, maintenance, and operation costs have to 
be estimated from similar, but still different technologies - like those used during the 
2003 SARS season.   One difference to consider is the high cost associated with the rental 
of equipment and hiring of expertise to maintain and operate the thermal scanning units.  
If “A Hot Idea” were to be implemented, a comparison would have to be made between 
the cost to lease and the cost to purchase outright.  Additionally, the costs quoted here 
were during the SARS outbreak of 2003.  Anytime technology is quickly implemented to 
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address an urgent need, elevated costs will result.   Competition and economies of scale 
would bring thermal scanning units down on a cost/unit basis.   
 
Morbidity Considerations   
 The discussion thus far has focused on the societal costs associated with 
mortality.  The illness rates, or the morbidity, associated with a similar scenario also 
warrants discussion.  For the base case used in Wein’s model, 1.49 million people will 
become infected with the 1 kg anthrax release in climatic conditions described in his 
paper.  These infected people would require treatment and require services from the 
medical apparatus of a city.  This volume would quickly overwhelm the medical 
apparatus.  Output from Wein’s model agrees with this statement.  Additionally, a 
classified exercise run by the U.S. government in the fall of 2003 further confirmed this 
(Wein, 2005).  On top of this the “worried well” presenting to the medical facilities 
would have to be dealt with.  To satisfy the capacity that would be required by the 
medical system, a 75-fold increase in facilities would have to be put into place for the 
Wein scenario (Wein, 2003).  This type of increase in care cannot be practically resolved 
but must be addressed in response plans and planned for accordingly.   
 
 From an economical benefit-cost standpoint, morbidity costs are not expected to 
have a major impact on the overall societal costs.  Therefore, market-based values were 
not assigned to quantify the effects of morbidity on society in this study.   However, this 
assumption of lower economic morbidity effects, should be investigated with further 
research.   
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 Emerging Infectious Disease Considerations 
 The data presented here deals with one anthrax scenario.  As discussed, many 
variables could be altered creating a different result.  The environmental conditions, the 
timeliness of antibiotic distribution, and the efficacy of pharmaceuticals are just three 
examples that, when changed, could produce significantly different effects and mortality 
numbers.  Additionally, if the incident were terrorist in nature, the technological 
capabilities and intelligence of the attacker would influence the severity of the attack.  
Keeping all the scenario variables constant, save one: the biological agent considered, has 
the potential to change the outcome to an even greater extent.   
 
 The potential economic severity presented by a pandemic strain of avian influenza 
virus was discussed earlier.  An economic analysis was not conducted in this study due to 
the scope of this work and the limited data available about a potential pandemic strain of 
this virus that has not yet emerged.  Follow-on research could explore this subject further.  
Some considerations of surveillance for avian influenza and other emerging infectious 
diseases are discussed in the analysis section of this work.   
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 Chapter 4 – Results and Analysis 
Comparative Benefit – Cost Findings 
 While the data was difficult to obtain, a comparative economic benefit – cost 
analysis was performed for a scenario involving anthrax.  The anthrax scenario was 
modeled by Lawrence Wein, et al.; and although peer reviewed, his work is still a model.   
A model with a different construct, or with different assumptions, would have resulted in 
a different output which could yield a different outcome in this effort.  With these 
limitations noted, the benefit-cost analysis yielded a societal savings of $84B in the event 
of an anthrax attack behaving according to Wein’s model.  Including the operation and 
maintenance cost, and assuming a probability of such an attack at 0.001, BioWatch 
represents a positive benefit-cost for 27 years.  A time period greater than this, without an 
anthrax attack but with BioWatch continuously operating is not economically justifiable.  
The benefit-cost analysis for “A Hot Idea” with a 12-hour response time yielded a 
societal savings of $144B in the scenario predicted by Wein’s model.  Although this is a 
greater cost averted, the cost of surveillance is also greater for “A Hot Idea.”  The greater 
operation and maintenance cost makes “A Hot Idea” economically justifiable for two 
years assuming the same 0.001 probability of anthrax attack.  Stated differently: a period 
without an anthrax attack greater than two years would result in a benefit-cost figure less 
than one and not be considered economically justifiable. 
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Additional Considerations 
Some of the differences in the two methodologies are not considered in this 
analysis.  The geographic area and the volume of air monitored by each methodology 
were not considered.  The vague numbers of samplers and lack of specific location 
information in the BioWatch construct makes an accurate number difficult to tabulate.  
Sampling units are deployed to cities with larger populations and greater likelihood of 
receiving a malicious biological release.  Specific detector locations are assumed to be 
based upon predominant meteorological conditions.  Shifting or abnormal weather 
patterns may jeopardize optimal placement of the air sampling BioWatch units.  
Additionally, microclimates are not always well-understood in urban environments; 
strange air movement patterns exist between and around large high-rise buildings.  
Optimal sampling locations in these atypical conditions are difficult to achieve all of the 
time.   
 
Sample Volume. 
One way to compare the coverage provided by the two methodologies is to 
consider the volume collected by each system.  “A Hot Idea” will conduct surveillance on 
½ of the commissioned workforce of New York City, or 32,916 city personnel.  The 
average person at rest consumes 6 liters of air per minute (L/min) (Fox, 2004).  During 
heavy exercise, this consumption rate can increase to 100 – 200 L/min (Fox, 2004).  
Conservatively using the 6 L/min rate, each person will “sample” 360 liters of air per 
hour, or 8640 liters per day.  With the workforce of 32,916, that equates to 284,394,240 
liters of air per day or 284.39 million liters of air per day.  In the event of an emergency 
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response, the rate of 6 L/min would significantly increase and thereby significantly 
increase the overall sample volume collected.  A high-volume air sampler, such as those 
used with BioWatch, can collect between 700 and 1500 L of air/min (Kimoto-Electric 
website, 2006).  This equals a volume of 2.16 million liters of air per day per sampler.  
Using the volume collected by “A Hot Idea” participating personnel equates to more than 
131 high-volume samplers for New York City.  BioWatch, on the other hand, has been 
estimated to have 500 air samplers working in 31 cities (Kosal, 2003), or an average of 
slightly over 16 air samplers per city.  New York City is the largest city in the United 
States.  Assuming twice the average number of samplers exist in New York City would 
equate to 32 air samplers.  The volume collected by 32 high-volume air sampling units is 
69.12 million liters of air per day.  These volumes are shown graphically in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12 - Volume Air Collected by Surveillance System.  Assumes "A Hot Idea" 
workforce of 32,916 and 32 BioWatch Samplers operating in New York City. 
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Some consideration should be made for this disparity in sampling volume.  Using 
the numbers above, “A Hot Idea” collects over four times the volume of air that 
BioWatch does.  If New York City had three times the average number of sampling units 
compared to the other cities enrolled in BioWatch, the volume collected (103.68 million 
liters/day) would still be less than half that collected by “A Hot Idea.”    
 
Normalizing to reflect an equal volume of air sampled would require a workforce 
approximately 25% the size used in the calculations above.  “A Hot Idea” workforce of 
8000 personnel consuming 6 L/min would sample approximately a same volume as 32 
BioWatch units.  The reduced workforce would require a proportionally smaller amount 
of thermal scanners.  The rental and O&M cost of 42 thermal scanning units is $1.4M and 
$14.7M, respectively.  Using these numbers a negative net return would result after nine 
years if an attack whose likelihood is 0.001 did not occur.  Table 6 shows the normalized 
results compared to the “No Surveillance”, “BioWatch”, and “A Hot Idea” scenarios 
described previously. 
Table 6 - Time to Negative Net Return for Different Biosurveillance Methodologies if 
Probablitly of Anthrax Attack is 0.001 
Methodology Capital Cost 
Annual O&M Cost 
 
Neg. Net Return w/ 
0.001 event probability 
No Surveillance $0 $0 - 
BioWatch $2M $3M 28 years 
“A Hot Idea” $5.8M $60.9M 3 years 
“A Hot Idea” 
(equal vol sampled) $1.4M $14.7M 9 years 
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“Design-To” Cost for “A Hot Idea” 
 Thus far, analysis has shown BioWatch to outperform “A Hot Idea” on the basis 
of “time until negative net return”.  Negative Net Return is dependent upon equation 3 
above.  The two components of equation 3 are the “Costs Averted” and the “Cost of 
Surveillance”.   “Costs averted” are similar between the methodologies but there is a vast 
difference in the “Cost of Surveillance.”  As stated previously, thermal scanner costs 
quoted in this analysis were those seen during the SARS outbreak of 2003.  Rental costs 
from the 2003 actions were used because these financial figures were available in the 
literature.  The O&M cost came when the technology was rather new and in high-
demand.  These costs would be reduced with greater competition and economies of scale 
if “A Hot Idea” were implemented in multiple cities.  The extent of cost reduction 
necessary to achieve the same negative net return time period as BioWatch was 
determined.     
 
 Purchasing the thermal scanners, as opposed to renting them, is a realistic 
decision that would likely occur with the fielding of a multiple city deployment of “A 
Hot Idea”.  A one-time capital cost of $1.4M would require an annual O&M cost of 
$5.1M.  These figures result in a negative net return at the same time as BioWatch.  
These “design-to” figures are shown in the last row of Table 7.   
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Table 7- "Design-To" Costs for "A Hot Idea" Resulting in Equal Time until Negative Net 
Return.  Note purchase price for thermal scanners replaces rental costs. 
Methodology Capital Cost 
Annual O&M Cost 
 
Neg. Net Return w/ 
0.001 event probability 
No Surveillance $0 $0 - 
BioWatch $2M* $3M 28 years 
“A Hot Idea” $5.8M** $60.9M 3 years 
“A Hot Idea” 
(equal vol sampled) $1.4M** $14.7M 9 years 
“A Hot Idea”  
“Design-To” 
calculation 
$1.4M* $5.1M 28 years 
*One-time purchase price 
** Annual rental price 
 
 
Mobile and Stationary Samplers. 
“A Hot Idea” samplers are mobile samplers while BioWatch’s are stationary.  By 
being mobile, a larger surface area of the city is covered.  Participating personnel travel 
inside buildings, on public transportation, and move throughout the day under, above and 
on the pavement of the city.  A larger variety of conditions are encountered by “A Hot 
Idea” personnel.   This was not considered in the economic analysis.   
 
Anthrax versus Other Agents. 
 This comparison evaluates the different methodology’s performance in the 
context of an anthrax attack.  Neither of the respective surveillance technologies was 
developed for the sole purpose of detecting the next anthrax attack.  BioWatch is an 
early-warning detection system looking for the presence of harmful biological agents in 
the cities where the system is operating.  A finite number of agents are looked for; the 
exact number is unknown but can be confidently stated that agents other than anthrax are 
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screened for.  “A Hot Idea” also looks for more agents than just anthrax. In fact, it could 
be said that “A Hot Idea” looks for many agents that have potential to infect large 
portions of society.  This is one of the stronger advantages to “A Hot Idea.”    
 
 “A Hot Idea” will theoretically find any agent that causes a statistically significant 
portion of a participating workforce to result with an elevated temperature.  In addition to 
finding Category A agents such as anthrax, plague, and tularemia, “A Hot Idea” will 
identify biological agents that cause “regular” public health problems such as seasonal 
influenza.  Finally, “A Hot Idea” will identify emerging infectious diseases that are new, 
and perhaps even unknown, at their time of presentation.  An avian influenza with the 
capability of human-to-human transmission – not proven to exist at the time of this 
writing – might be an example.   
 
 The ability to find any agent is based on the idea that an actual human being is 
being used as the sensor to identify biological agents that will harm human beings.  This 
cyclical detection relationship is what allows detection of infectious agents that cause a 
spike in temperature.  Developing a collection technology as exquisite and accurate as the 
human immune system is difficult, if not impossible. 
 
Pathophysiology of Elevation in Temperature 
“A Hot Idea” considers elevation in temperature as one of the initial signs after 
the foreign agent enters the body.  Disease progresses in stages starting with the 
incubation period. The incubation period is defined as “the time from the moment of 
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inoculation (exposure) to the development of the clinical manifestations of a particular 
infectious disease”  (Pharma-Lexicon.com, 2006).  The next stage or phase of disease is 
called the prodromal period.  The prodromal period is defined as “time during which a 
disease process has begun but is not yet clinically manifest” (Pharma-Lexicon.com, 
2006).  The prodromal period is the short interval between the incubation period and 
illness; the beginning appearance of symptoms (subjective) when the patient is getting 
sick but without clinical signs (objective) being evident.     Following the prodromal 
period is the period of illness, then the acme (the height of illness), decline, and finally 
resolution (Abedon, 1998).    
 
The first two stages of disease are those that “A Hot Idea” is concerned with; the 
incubation and prodromal periods.   Does the body respond by increasing temperature 
before other clinical signs and symptoms are evident?  If so, can “A Hot Idea” find this 
temperature increase before the disease is clinically manifest? 
 
The hypothalamus is the region of the brain that regulates temperature.  In 
addition to maintaining the normal, homeostatic temperature of the body, the 
hypothalamus is also capable of raising the “set temperature.”  When fighting an 
infection, the body benefits from a elevation of temperature.  A rise in temperature makes 
the body less hospitable to bacteria.  Additionally, increases in baseline temperature boost 
immunity to viral agents by releasing interferons.  Interferons are “a family of proteins 
derived from human cells which normally has a role in fighting viral infections by 
preventing virus multiplication in cells” (Pharma-Lexicon.com, 2006).   
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 To induce a rise in temperature, the hypothalamus increases the body’s baseline 
temperature.  The pathophysiology involves pyrogens (proteins) that start a cascade of 
events that eventually raise the body’s baseline temperature and produce an elevation in 
temperature and eventually, a fever.  Generally there are two types of pyrogens: 
exogenous and endogenous.  Exogenous pyrogens come from foreign agents in the body, 
notably microbial cells or toxins.  Endogenous pyrogens are host cell-derived cytokines, 
usually from macrophages.  Cytokines are signaling molecules, similar to hormones 
(Pharma-Lexicon.com, 2006).    The metabolites of exogenous pyrogens induce the 
production of endogenous pyrogens.  The process by which these pyrogenic cytokines 
cause elevations in temperature is not completely understood.   The cytokines may 
interact with each other or with metabolites of cytokines, cross the blood-brain barrier to 
reach the thermal regulating center of the hypothalamus region triggering another set of 
events increasing one’s baseline temperature (Prewitt, 2005; Merck, 1999).  This new 
baseline temperature is maintained using the same negative feedback loops that maintain 
a normal temperature in a healthy body.    
 
Data Management and Individual Temperature Profiles  
The data management piece to “A Hot Idea” is crucial to the success of this 
methodology.  Developing an accurate temperature profile for each participating 
individual in the program is imperative to avoid confusing a rise in temperature with the 
daily undulation expected due to circadian rhythm fluctuations.   
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Defining the average body temperature as 37°C, an elevated temperature as 
anything above 37°C, and a fever as > 38°C, is an incorrect assumption for “A Hot Idea” 
purposes.  First the numbers above are for an entire population, not an individual.  
Second, standardized methods were not adhered to in the past: times of day, indoor 
temperatures, ovulatory status, calibration of thermometers, and placement of the 
temperature measuring devices were some variables that were not kept constant.  With a 
better knowledge of physiological mechanisms the body uses to regulate temperature, a 
better understanding of hormone interaction and cellular metabolism, and having 
calibration techniques for thermometers, a more accurate normal range can now be 
defined.  Individual temperature profiles with greater specificity will be developed using 
controlled methodology to use with “A Hot Idea.”   
 
Body temperatures vary both within a particular individual and within the general 
population.   In an individual, the temperature variation is due to circadian rhythm, and is 
about 0.6°C (1°F) (Merck, 1999).   The nadir, or low point is 6 AM and the zenith, or 
high point, is between 4 and 6 PM (Mackowiak, 1992).  A study looking at adults aged 
19 to 59 years reported an average ear temperature range of 35.0°C to 37.8°C (Sund-
Levander, 2004).   Mackowiak’s work found 36.8°C as the mean oral temperature of 
subjects, higher temperatures for women than men, and a trend of higher temperatures in 
African-Americans than in Caucasians (Mackowiak, 1992).  Body temperature is also 
dependant upon the ovulatory cycle in women; when ovulating, body temperatures 
increases by ~0.3°C (Craig Medical Distribution, 2006).  Post-menopausal women have 
lower temperatures than menstruating women; more similar to the men’s range (Sund-
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Levander, 2004).  These results are all normalized to reflect the range of temperature to 
the average person in the average environment.  Altering the individual’s physical 
environment will provide further variation to the normal range.   
 
One’s physical state of health has to be considered.  The state of health should be 
considered in two ways – versus the general populace and versus the normal state of 
physical health for that individual.  First, compared to the populace, those with lower 
body mass indices have less fat to insulate the body with and therefore have lower normal 
temperatures.  Similarly, because women generally have a larger amount of subcutaneous 
fat than men, this is one mechanism that contributes to women having higher 
temperatures than men.  Lower resting heart rates and higher metabolic levels will also 
affect temperature levels.  Addressing the second consideration, a person’s current state 
of health compared to their normal state of health, an individual’s body temperature 
fluctuates with the level of exercise, stress, and hydration (DiscoveryMedical.com, 2005).    
Temperatures fluctuate due to metabolic activity and therefore the diet of individuals 
should be considered (e.g. an individual’s temperature will vary depending upon when a 
meal was eaten last - 30 minutes ago or 5 hours ago).   Variables affecting the 
temperature are numerous.  A well-thought out data management system will be needed 
to resolve these issues.   
 
Individual temperature profiles will need to be developed for each participant in 
“A Hot Idea.”   A “baselining” period of some time (e.g. 6 to 12 months) will be needed 
to create a unique temperature profile with statistical merit.  This baselining period may 
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have to be longer for women in the program as they normally experience a greater 
amount of variation in their temperatures due to ovulatory cycles.   
 
Ease of use for the participants of “A Hot Idea” should also be considered when 
designing the data management and collection process.  Thermal scanners have 
advertised needing a measurement time of 3 seconds to accurately record and report 
temperatures.  A “user-friendly” procedure is crucial to gain acceptance of the new 
surveillance methodology.     
 
Does diurnal variation occur in the presence of fever?   During a 24 hour period, 
temperature varies from lowest levels in the early morning to the highest levels in the late 
afternoon.  Overall however, there is a lack of temperature measurement data conducted 
in a standardized manner.  Individual temperature profile data collection and management 
is addressed again in the follow-on research section of the next chapter.   
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 Chapter 5 - Discussion 
 This research effort compared different biosurveillance methodologies using a 
benefit – cost deterministic model.  A currently fielded air sampling system, BioWatch, 
was compared and contrasted to a thermo-detection methodology called “A Hot Idea.”   
A “do-nothing” approach was also considered.  Available information regarding the 
methodologies was limited and therefore, there was a lack of concrete data to analyze 
with the benefit – cost approach.  However, several observations, considerations, and 
further research areas were identified.   
  
 Biopreparedness initiatives are a complicated and complex issue.  The scientific 
and rational answer may not be implemented due to political pressures and public 
understanding of the issues at hand.  Some studies have concluded that, in the case of 
anthrax, pre-event vaccination efforts are the most important initiative (Wein, 2005).  
Others have cited rapid pharmaceutical distribution after an attack as the critical effort to 
avert societal impact from a biological release (Kaufmann, 1997).  This research did not 
focus on either of these ideas.  In reality, a combination of systems will be implemented 
to address the need for readiness against harmful biological agents.  One of these systems 
is biosurveillance.  BioWatch is currently operating in 31 cities across the country.  “A 
Hot Idea” is another surveillance methodology that should be considered further.  The 
political backlash associated with a “do-nothing” approach makes this option unlikely.  
Allocating resources from biosurveillance to other initiatives such as a vaccination or 
antibiotic distribution program could be considered but was not undertaken here.   
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  Modeling with one biological agent and one set of environmental conditions, 
BioWatch was found to be more economically beneficial than “A Hot Idea.”    With a 
likelihood of anthrax attack set at 0.001, BioWatch returned a positive benefit – cost ratio 
for 27 years while “A Hot Idea” returned a positive benefit – cost ratio for three years.  
  
 Comment on these results should be made.  “A Hot Idea” collects multiple 
volumes of air more than that collected by the high-volume samplers used in BioWatch.   
When adjusted to an equal volume of air, “A Hot Idea” returned a positive benefit – cost 
ratio for eight years.  The sampling personnel for “A Hot Idea” are mobile and cover a 
lager area of a city including outdoor and indoor environments.  Sampling a larger 
volume and covering a larger surface area provides a more thorough surveillance of a city 
for harmful biological agents.   BioWatch screens for a limited number of agents where 
“A Hot Idea” looks for any and all agents that will cause an elevation in temperature.  
The “any and all” includes both presently existing microbes and unknown organisms that 
may emerge in the future.   
 
 The potential capabilities of “A Hot Idea” are enormous.  If the enabling 
technologies can be developed supporting the “A Hot Idea” methodology, “A Hot Idea” 
is the better of the two choices.  The enabling technologies need to be fleshed out and 
their feasibility determined.  The data management of individual temperature profiles will 
need to be specific enough to recognize small incremental deviations from the person’s 
average temperature taking into account metabolic fluctuations and different activity 
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levels.  Better pathophysiological understanding of the earliest time in the elevation in 
temperature needs to be determined - long before a defined fever of 38°C is reached.  
Understanding of the mechanisms at work during the initial generation of pyrogens is 
crucial.  If pyrogens are not created or do not interact with the hypothalamus during the 
incubation period and only begin during the short prodromic period, a fever mechanism 
will not be triggered and therefore, will not be picked up by “A Hot Idea” regardless of 
the specificity within individual temperature profiles.   
 
 An advantage of “A Hot Idea” is the ability to detect a great number of today’s 
present biological agents and tomorrow’s emerging infectious agents.  The cornerstone of 
this is the temperature increase in the human body.  Anthrax, plague, tularemia, and 
smallpox all have prodromic fevers; Venezuelan equine encephalitis and Q-fever have 
fever associated with the illness period (USAMRIID, 2004).  Individuals infected with 
brucellosis experience an undulating fever.  An individual exposed to malaria on the 
other hand, may not present with a fever for months.  Arguably malaria isn’t generally 
considered a biowarfare agent of concern but the issue is with the body’s different 
response to different agents.  An emerging infectious disease that does not produce an 
early fever would be problematic to “A Hot Idea.”   BioWatch would also have problems 
with an emerging infectious disease but for different reasons; because BioWatch is only 
looking for a list of expected agents.  
 
 Finally, the capability of physicians and medical laboratories to be able to identify 
any agent infecting the human body needs further exploration.  The differential diagnosis 
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by today’s physicians does not include emerging infectious diseases that have not been 
previously identified.   The outbreak of hantavirus in the four corners region of the 
United States in 1993 was not recognized for almost a month (Zubay, 2005).  The time to 
arrive at the correct diagnosis should be studied to accurately estimate the time until 
response activities are initiated.     
 
Follow-on Research 
 Disregarding the limitations due to available data, several limitations and 
unknowns were discovered for each respective biosurveillance methodology.  These 
limitations could be researched in follow-on studies.   
 
Morbidity Study. 
 With more solid data, follow-on research efforts could focus on the morbidity 
aspect of a biological release.  Viscusi’s Value of Statistical Life (VSL) figure of $6.3M 
is considered the standard for policy decisions today.  Using this value to compute 
societal costs for mortality is well founded.  Finding a similarly accepted figure or 
methodology to calculate morbidity costs is more difficult.  Without a thorough effort to 
define well-founded economic values for morbidity, quantifying societal costs would 
only add more uncertainty and therefore was not undertaken during this study.  Follow-on 
research efforts could look into the impact morbidity plays on society cost.  Patients 
could be classified into three categories:  in-patient hospitalizations, out-patient hospital 
visits, and those not seeking medical care.  The groups could then be further divided into 
age groups: 0-19, 20-64, and over 65 years to further delineate the impact missed time 
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from work and family would have on the society.  These costs could then be added to the 
mortality piece that was completed in this paper for an overall, morbidity and mortality 
cost to society.   
 
Individual Temperature Profiles. 
 The general concept behind “A Hot Idea” is attractive at first glance.  Unknowns 
that need to be resolved to discern the full potential of the idea are many.   Can the 
sensitivity of current temperature measuring devices be reduced to flag the first sign of 
infection?   Temperature measurement is done today in terms of distinguishing a fever 
from a non-fever.  This thought process will need to be changed with “A Hot Idea” into 
one that looks for the earliest rise in temperature due to the presence of a pathogen. 
Today’s temperature measurements are interpreted using the variation of the general 
population.  Doing so introduces the standard deviation for the general population which 
includes a wide variety of variables.  Different genders, ethnic backgrounds, ages, states 
of health, and environments are all covered by the accepted average and febrile 
temperatures of 37°C and 38°C, respectively.   These are only a few of the examples that 
affect temperature variation in a population.  For “A Hot Idea” to effectively work, 
individual temperature profiles will have to be built for each worker participating in the 
program.  How much does intra-species temperatures vary from day to day?  How much 
does an individual’s level of activity affect their individual temperature profile?  Limited 
studies were found in the literature regarding studies of intra-species temperature 
variation.  Those studies that were found had a low number of subjects (Wouter, 2002). 
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 A follow-on research effort could establish individual temperature profiles and 
determine the standard deviation observed intra-species.   If conducted with personnel 
attending the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) in Dayton, Ohio, a rather 
stratified population would be evaluated.  Personnel enrolled at AFIT are required to 
meet certain physical fitness standards and are generally at an age that would be 
representative of the workforce that would be monitored with “A Hot Idea” methodology.   
Details preceding the measurement of temperature could be recorded.  Examples could 
include: level of activity individual was involved with, time since last meal, contents of 
the last meal, and environmental temperatures and conditions the individual recently 
worked in.   
 
 The initial concept of “A Hot Idea” involved the monitoring of pre- and post-
workshift temperatures.  One requirement is to minimize the standard variation of the 
individual being monitored so that the earliest onset of illness can be recognized.  
Individual temperature profiles are one solution to achieve this, but at the same time, the 
variables that individuals undergo each day may introduce a larger day-to-day 
temperature variation than desired.  If the variation is found to be too great due to 
changing everyday conditions (e.g. outside temperature, level of exertion at work, details 
with diet, etc.), “A Hot Idea” might sacrifice some detection time to tighten the standard 
deviation seen in individual profiles.  Temperatures could be collected only once per day.  
They would be taken initially in the morning before workshifts begin, just after rest has 
concluded, and when the body is closest to its true state of homeostasis.  This would 
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eliminate some of the variables influencing temperature introducing large amounts of 
standard variation into the measurements.    
 
Pyrogen Physiology. 
Related to the study of individual temperature profiles, the presence and 
interaction of pyrogens could be looked at further.  Using the blood of horseshoe crabs, 
Limulus amoebocyte lysate assays have been developed to ensure the absence of 
endospores (which are a form of pyrogens) in sterile environments.  More medically 
related in research, valuable information pertaining to the onset of fever and the 
cornerstone of “A Hot Idea” could be obtained.    
 
Radio-Frequency Identification. 
 Data management systems will have to be developed to efficiently handle the 
large amounts of data.  Streamlining the process to the most “user-friendly” configuration 
will help with acceptance of the methodology.  Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) 
technology should be explored to assist with this.  The potential for RFID is just being 
realized.  One example could include coding data onto grain-sized media for 
identification purposes.  This is the same technology used to identify consumers with 
ExxonMobil’s SpeedPass system at fueling stations (Technovelgy.com, 2006).  Easy 
identification of “A Hot Idea” personnel could be enabled when checking in and out from 
the work environment with RFID.  Next-generation RFID could have even greater 
implications on “A Hot Idea”:  a RFID device could be inserted into individuals to track 
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their temperatures.  Real-time temperature data would eliminate the use of thermal 
scanners and provide enormous amount of data to monitor for anomalies.   
 
Conclusion  
 Providing surveillance for harmful biological material is a complex and difficult 
task.  No panacea exists satisfying all requirements and a combination of initiatives is 
required to maximize biological readiness.  The two methodologies looked at in this 
paper each have separate strengths, limitations, and challenges.  The currently operational 
BioWatch is providing some level of protection today.  Past operating procedures in the 
event of a positive response, unknown background biological agent concentrations, and a 
limited list of agents screened for are challenges to the system.  Conversely, while not yet 
fielded, the proof-of-concept behind “A Hot Idea” is attractive but needs further research 
to determine the practicality of overcoming the challenges mentioned in this paper.   
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